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CHAPTER 1
CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE’S 
DEPENDENCE ON RUSSIAN GAS, WESTERN 
CIS TRANSIT STATES AND THE QUEST 




Conventional wisdom dictates Central and Eastern European (CEE) depend-
encies on Russian gas imports and the western Commonwealth of Independent 
States’ (CIS)3 position as transit routes. But despite the common past, the CEE 
region is not totally homogeneous. / e 13 gas importing countries4 of Central 
and Eastern Europe operate under di1 erent conditions. / ey are to a di1 erent 
extent dependent on gas, gas imports, and Russian gas. A central question is 
the extent to which a country’s domestic gas production can meet its demand. 
In addition to this, other major elements need consideration: the number of 
pipelines; the number of directions and from which directions a country can 
receive gas; the number of through-transiting pipelines (if any); the existence 
of coastlines for terminals to regasify lique& ed natural gas (or LNG); and the 
capacity of a country’s underground gas storage.5
1 Center for Economic and Regional Studies, Hungarian Academy of Sciences.
2 In this study, the quantity of natural gas is in billions of cubic meters. However, the standards di1 er among 
the International Energy Agency (IEA), BP, the former Soviet Union, and the European countries. / e 
abbreviations used for units of measurement in this study are: bcm – billion cubic metres; bcma – billion 
cubic metres per annum; mmcm – million cubic metres; mcm – thousand cubic metres; mmtpa – millions 
of tonnes per annum. Research for this chapter was completed on October 25, 2012.
3 Belarus, Ukraine, and Moldova.
4 / ese are Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, 
Slovenia, Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Macedonia. Croatia has not extended its long-term gas supply 
contract with Russia a; er expiration at the end of 2010. Among the Central and Eastern European coun-
tries, Albania and Montenegro (and Kosovo), lacking import capacity, do not import any gas.
5 / e issue of underground gas storage facilities is not a constituent of the analysis, but it will nevertheless em-
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/ e Russo-Ukrainian gas crisis of January 2009 showed exactly the conditions 
of the Central and Eastern European states’ achievements for improving the 
security of supply at that time. Southeast Europe su1 ered very seriously, and 
in Central Europe the e1 ect of the gas crisis for Slovakia also was particularly 
signi& cant. Under these circumstances, the Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico 
(also prime minister prior to the crisis) proposed restarting the recently idled 
second block of the Bohunice nuclear power plant as an anti-crisis measure. 
Bulgaria, more dramatically a1 ected, also hinted at reopening one unit at the 
Kozloduy nuclear power plant.6
Since 2005, several signed or extended contracts with Gazprom7 in the CEE 
region concern gas supply, but some contracts expired already or expire in the 
early or mid-2010s. Prior to the renewing or extending of these contracts, an im-
portant consideration is predicting the amount of needed Russian gas to obtain 
leverage for bargaining positions enhanced by the demonstration of progress for 
diversi& cation projects.
2.  Market changes in Europe and Gazprom, with special attention 
to the pricing and the CEE region
In the last four to & ve years, the global gas market has changed signi& cantly. 
Although these changes have a1 ected various regions di1 erently, several factors 
have been shaping the adjustment process to these changes: the onset and the 
e1 ects of the economic crisis, the sharp rise in unconventional gas production 
(most importantly the shale gas revolution in the United States), the surge in 
lique& ed natural gas production, and globalizing gas markets.
Before the economic crisis, European gas customers sought to sign or extend 
long-term gas supply contracts with Gazprom, thus ensuring a 20 to 30-year sup-
ply. When oil prices surged to a record level in July 2008, Gazprom’s Chairperson 
of the Management Committee, Alexei Miller, expected oil prices to rise to USD 
250 a barrel and, consequently, gas prices to spike to USD 1,000 per mcm.8,9
phasize the importance of them. Among Gazprom’s customers in the region, Estonia, Lithuania, Slovenia, 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Macedonia have no storage capacity, while Serbia recently opened facilities.
6 EurActiv.com, January 12, 2009, http://www.euractiv.com/energy/gas-crisis-gives-slovakia-excuse-news- 
221021.
7 Gazprom or its 100 per cent owned subsidiaries have the exclusive right to export gas or LNG produced in 
Russia. / is monopoly does not apply to production-sharing agreements.
8 Reuters, July 3, 2008, http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/07/03/gazprom-gas-prices-idUSL034124 
1220080703.
9 In continental Europe, in the long-term gas supply contracts gas prices are mainly linked to oil product prices 
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A few months later, a totally di1 erent situation appeared in the gas market. In 
2009, gas demand declined sharply in Europe. / is consequently produced an 
oversupply, allowing spot E.ON Ruhrgas market gas prices to fall well below oil 
product-indexed prices in contracts for long-term gas supply. Moreover, a; er 
recovering from a downward spiral, oil prices have remained (relatively) high. 
Since the end of 2008, the so-called “two price” or “hybrid price” market has 
existed,10 allowing growth for the role of gas trading hubs and their prices. 
All these factors meant Gazprom’s European customers needed less and cheaper 
gas. In 2009, gas demand, determined by the economic crisis in Europe, caused 
gas consumption to fall by 7 per cent. In 2010, the cold weather caused sig-
ni& cant increase in demand, 6 per cent above the 2009 level. / e warm weather 
characterizing 2011 caused demand for gas to fall by 8 per cent,11 In 2011, three 
additional factors garnered serious attention: the temporary suspension of Lib-
ya’s gas exports, the Fukushima nuclear disaster, and its subsequent inJ uence on 
operations of nuclear power plants. In early 2012, the shock of demand for gas 
in Europe attracted attention. At present, apart from weather conditions, prob-
lems with economic growth, relatively high gas prices, the growth of renewable 
energy sources, and extremely low CO2 prices have driven European demand 
for gas.12 As the IEA claimed, during 2011, neither long-term nor spot-indexed 
gas could compete with coal as a marginal source for base-load electricity gener-
ation, in part due to a signi& cant drop in CO2 prices.13 Fluctuation in gas prices 
in the United States has had signi& cant impact on coal consumption in Europe, 
which imports U.S. coal.
Gas exports outside the former Soviet Union14 by Gazprom Export, a 100 per 
cent owned subsidiary of Gazprom, fell sharply in 2009 (from 158.8 bcm in 
2008 to 140.6 bcm in 2009) due to lower demand, high contract prices, and 
interruption in supply during the Russo–Ukrainian gas crisis of January 2009. 
A slightly steeper decline occurred in 2010 before a spike in 2011 (from 138.6 
bcm in 2010 to 150.0 bcm in 2011); however, despite this spike, gas exports still 
and take or pay requirements, meaning imposition of minimum purchase obligations. 
10 J. Stern and H. Rogers, The Transition to Hub-Based Gas Pricing in Continental Europe, Oxford Institute 
for Energy Studies, NG 49, March 2011.
11 J. Stern, Natural Gas in Europe and Asia: Supply and Demand Perspectives, NOG/UI Seminar: / e Great 
Gas Game: Supply of Natural Gas to Europe and Asia, Stockholm, May 10, 2012, http://www.ui.se/upl/
& les/73355.pdf.
12 Natural Gas Information 2012 (Paris: IEA, 2012); Medium-Term Gas Market Report 2012 (Paris: IEA, 
2012).
13 Medium-Term Gas Market Report 2012, 142.
14 / is gas belongs to Gazprom’s gas balance (or produced/owned by Gazprom) and is sold under long-term 
gas supply contracts. In this chapter, we do not analyze the causes of di1 erences between data taken from the 
Russian customs statistics and various Gazprom sources.
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remained far below the 2008 level. In 2011, the EU’s main external source of sup-
ply was Russia, supplying 24 per cent of the EU’s gas consumption. Other major 
sources were Norway (19%), Algeria (9%), and Qatar (7%).15 In 2010, European 
LNG imports increased signi& cantly, and then declined slightly in 2011.16
According to the Russian daily Vedomosti, in 2011, Macedonia paid the highest 
price for Russian gas (USD 462 per mcm) while Armenia enjoyed the lowest 
price (USD 180 per mcm). In the CEE region, the o1 er price to Slovakia was 
USD 333, which was even lower than for Moldova (USD 338). In 2010, the dis-
similarity remained, and Slovenia was the only country in the CEE region hav-
ing a price (USD 377) lower than Germany’s (USD 379). Paying record prices 
among all customers of Gazprom were Bosnia-Herzegovina (USD 429), Poland 
(USD 420), and the Czech Republic (USD 419). Bulgaria purchased gas for 
USD 391, Hungary for USD 383, and Romania for USD 380. Vedomosti re-
corded only one price for the Baltic States, USD 397.17
Due to the take or pay provision, customers had to seriously consider the conse-
quences from amounts of gas not (yet) accepted within a given contract year. In 
2009, almost all customers of Gazprom Export outside the former Soviet Union 
bought less gas than in 2008. In terms of volume, Germany, Turkey, and Italy, be-
ing the three main customers, lowered their purchases the most. In 2009, Poland 
was the only country who, a; er eliminating the controversial Russo–Ukrainian 
intermediary company Rosukrenergo (see below), signi& cantly increased im-
ports; Switzerland accepted a similar amount as in 2008. In 2010, Poland be-
came, and has retained (ahead of France), the position of fourth largest custom-
er of Gazprom Export outside the former Soviet Union.18 Italy, the third largest 
importer of Russian gas a; er Germany and Turkey, was also seriously impacted 
in 2010. In 2010, Turkey also signi& cantly reduced gas purchases from Russia 
but to a much lesser extent. However, in 2011, Turkey and Italy accounted for 
the bulk of the increase. Italy purchased more gas from Russia to compensate for 
a shortfall from Libya.19 To be more precise, the closure of the Libyan–Italian 
Greenstream gas pipeline allowed Italy’s ENI to replace Libyan supplies with 
pre-paid gas from Gazprom.20
15 Eurogas Press Release, March 29, 2012, http://www.eurogas.org/uploaded/Eurogas%20press%20release% 
20on%20More%20customers,%20consuming%20less%20gas,%20in%202011.pdf.
16 Medium-Term Oil and Gas Markets 2011 (Paris: IEA, 2011), 186; Medium-Term Gas Market Report 2012, 104.
17 Vedomosti, June 18, 2012; naturally various averages are given for the other cases as well.
18 As to Gazprom Group’s total sales in Europe, Poland and France had already changed positions in 2009, but 
in 2009 and 2011, gas sales to the UK exceeded those in Poland.
19 Financial Times, February 16, 2012, http://www.; .com/intl/cms/s/0/2e57f4c4-58ad-11e1-9f28-00144 
eabdc0.html#axzz1oivhTm7f.
20 ICIS Heren, March 3, 2011, http://www.icis.com/heren/articles/2011/03/03/9440628/gazprom-counts-
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In 2011, 25.3 per cent of gas exports by Gazprom Export outside the former 
Soviet Union went to 10 Central and Eastern European states. / is volume (ac-
counting for 38 bcm of gas) is more than 10 per cent below the 2008 level; but, 
if ignoring Croatia, then exports are almost 8 per cent below the 2008 volume. 
In 2011, apart from Poland and Macedonia, all countries bought less gas from 
Gazprom than in 2008.
Since 2010, Gazprom has granted various concessions for price reductions to 
several regional companies in long-term gas supply contracts. In December 
2010, Latvia and Estonia received o1 ers for 15 per cent lower prices, provided 
they increased gas consumption to the 2007 level (i.e. to pre-crisis levels).21 As 
of July 2011, import prices declined for Hungary’s E.ON Földgáz Trade, a sub-
sidiary of Germany’s E.ON Ruhrgas.22 In 2011, SPP of Slovakia was among the 
companies receiving revised prices, and in December 2011, Serbia achieved a 
12 per cent price reduction for 2012.23 In the same year, Bulgaria received a dis-
count of 11 per cent from April 2012 until the end of 2012.24 
In the CEE region, disputes concerning prices for RWE Transgas, the Czech 
subsidiary of Germany’s RWE, the PGNiG of Poland, and the Lithuanian En-
ergy Ministry with the Gazprom Group are due for resolution via arbitration.25 
A; er the arrangement with E.ON Ruhrgas in early July 2012, ending arbitra-
tion, Gazprom declared successful defence of its price model.26 But Jonathan 
Stern (Oxford Institute of Energy Studies) believes Gazprom was, in fact, un-
able to preserve its oil-linked contracts. “Europe is moving to hub-based pricing, 
and that means Gazprom is as well.”27
Gazprom responded too late to the market processes and lost market share in 
Europe.28 However, from the point of view of Gazprom, priority accrues to rev-
on-rue-gas-as-production-falls,-exports-soar.html.
21 RIA Novosti, December 24, 2010, http://en.rian.ru/business/20101224/161916344.html.
22 T. Horváth, Aktuális kihívások a magyar földgázpiacon – egy Supplier szemszögébQl, September 15, 2011 
(Conference Presentation), http://www.cebc.hu/ppt/energetika2011/horvath_tibor.pdf.
23 According to media information, this addendum will be in place for as long as the new long-term contract 
remains. (Kommersant, February 24, 2012, http://www.kommersant.ru/doc-rss/1879271.)
24 / e 11 per cent & gure is an average for the three contracts with Bulgaria. (Ministry of Economy, Energy and 
Tourism of the Republic of Bulgaria – News, August 28, 2012, http://www.mi.government.bg/en/news/
delyan-dobrev-otstapkata-ot-11-ot-cenata-na-gaza-e-v-sila-ot-1-vi-april-do-kraya-na-godinata-830.html.)
25 A; er completing this study, PGNiG secured a deal with Gazprom.
26 Reuters, July 5, 2012, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/07/05/us-energy-gas-europe-gazprom-idUS-
BRE8640FN20120705.
27 Financial Times, February 16, 2012, http://www.; .com/intl/cms/s/0/2e57f4c4-58ad-11e1-9f28-00144 
feabdc0.html#axzz1oivhTm7f.
28 A.A. Konoplyanik, Russian Gas at European Energy Market: Why Adaptation is Inevitable, Energy Strategy 
Reviews 1, no. 1 (March 2012): 42 56.
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enue generation and not exports’ volumes. In 2011, 58 per cent of the gas sold 
in Europe was according to an oil-linked formula, but due to renegotiations and 
arbitration, this ratio reJ ects a decline.29 Gazprom supplies only 7 per cent of its 
total gas exports to Europe at spot rates.30
A serious warning for Gazprom occurred when, at the end of September 2011, in 
order to investigate possible anti-competitive practices the European Commis-
sion o]  cials undertook unannounced inspections at the premises of companies 
active in supply, transmission, and storage of gas in several EU Member States, 
mainly in Central and Eastern Europe.31 A year later, in early September 2012, 
the European Commission launched an anti-trust probe of Gazprom for three 
suspected anti-competitive practices in Central and Eastern Europe involving 
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, and 
Bulgaria.32 First, Gazprom may have divided gas markets by hindering free J ow 
of gas across Member States. Second, Gazprom may have prevented diversi& ca-
tion of the supply of gas, and third, Gazprom may have imposed unfair prices 
on its customers by linking the price of gas to oil prices.33 Previously, one-and-
half years before the anti-trust investigation, in January 2011, the Lithuanian 
Ministry of Energy & led a complaint with the European Commission request-
29 Natural Gas Europe, September 13, 2012, http://www.naturalgaseurope.com/shale-gas-needed-for-fully-
functioning-eu-gas-market.
30 / is data is derived from Gazprom’s 2011 November Base Prospectus and reiterated by Alexander Medvedev 
(of Gazprom) in Gazprom’s Investor Day in London on February 14, 2012. However, current understanding 
is that this & gure has increased since that time. ( Investor Day, London, February 14, 2012, Questions and 
answers, Gazprom, Gazprom, http://www.gazprom.com/f/posts/67/590264/2012-02-14-investor-day-
london-en.pdf.)
31 European Commission – Press Release, MEMO/11/641, September 27, 2011, http://europa.eu/rapid/
press-release_MEMO-11-641_en.htm?locale=en.
32 European Commission – Press Release, IP/12/937, September 4, 2012, http://europa.eu/rapid/pressRe-
leasesAction.do?reference=IP/12/937&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en; 
Bloomberg, September 4, 2012 http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-09-04/gazprom-faces-eu-anti-
trust-probe-on-eastern-european-gas-sales.html.
33 In response, on September 11, 2012, President Putin signed an Executive Order that states, “open joint stock 
companies on the list of strategic enterprises and their subsidiaries should supply information on their activi-
ties (unless such information must be published or disclosed in any case) upon request from the authorities 
and agencies of foreign countries, international organisations, associations and groups of foreign countries, 
only subject to prior consent of a respective federal executive body authorised by the Russian Government. 
/ e same procedure shall apply if the aforementioned economic actors make amendments to contracts con-
cluded with foreign counteragents and other such documents pertaining to their business (pricing) policy 
in foreign countries, or for the purposes of alienating their shares and stakes in foreign entities, rights to 
conduct business activity on foreign soil, and titles to real estate located abroad, should the above actions 
are accomplished on demand of the abovementioned organisations, bodies and groups.” / e Executive Or-
der states that the authorized federal executive body must refuse to grant its consent to these actions to 
proceed if they could harm Russia’s economic interests. (“Executive order on measures protecting Russian 
interests in Russian legal entities’ foreign economic activities,” September 11, 2012, http://eng.kremlin.ru/
news/4401#sel=.)
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ing investigation of abuse due to the dominant position of Gazprom.34 While 
Günther Oettinger was EU Energy Commissioner, Lithuania, in mid-Septem-
ber 2012, emphasized that Russian gas prices to the EU Member States should 
not vary greatly.35
In the & rst half of the 2000s, the Directorate-General for Competition (DG 
COMP) initiated removal of territorial restrictions (“destination clauses”) from 
contracts for supplying gas concluded by Gazprom with a number of gas whole-
salers in the EU. / e parties found mutually acceptable alternatives with ENI, 
OMV, and E.ON Ruhrgas, and in June 2005, the European Commission ceased 
its review of Gazprom’s contracts. A; er that, Gazprom declared further exclu-
sion of such clauses in new contracts with companies organized under the laws 
of a Member State of the EU (“EU companies”).36 Consequently, the issue of 
li; ing the ban on gas re-export can receive attention in Central and Eastern 
Europe.37
3.  Gas demand and production in Central and Eastern Europe
3.1 Role of gas in primary energy consumption in Central and Eastern 
European countries
Central and Eastern European countries38 can represent three distinct groups 
based on the role of gas as the primary energy for consumption. In 2011, gas had 
tha largest role in primary energy consumption in Hungary (38.2%) and Lithua-
nia (36%), but this ratio was also high in Latvia (33.1%), Romania (30.8%), 
Croatia (30.8%) and Slovakia (28.1%). In all six cases, representing the & rst 
group of countries, ratios were higher than the OECD average, and even the 
34 Ministry of Energy of the Republic of Lithuania – News, January 25, 2011, http://www.enmin.lt/en/news/
detail.php?ID=1198.
35 Reuters, September 14, 2012, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/09/14/eu-gas-gazprom-idUSL5E-
8KE9YZ20120914.
36 Report on Competition Policy 2005, European Commission, 2007, http://ec.europa.eu/competition/pub-
lications/annual_report/2005/en.pdf; Gazprom’s Base Prospectus dated 19 July 2005; Gazprom’s Base 
Prospectus dated 13 August 2007.
37 / e problem is, arguably, more subtle when considering old contracts. István Kutas, then Head of Com-
munications at E.ON Földgáz Trade, in reply to direct questions said in early September 2008 [author’s 
translation], Critical amounts concerning the ToP [take or pay] are partly exported (i.e. not acquired from 
Baumgarten, but sold there), partly redirected to our mother company, and partly are not taken (or delayed 
o~  ake). Our contract has not changed in this respect, but intra-EU trade is not considered as export and, 
therefore, not covered by the clause. In Poland, signed in October 2010, an annex to the existing long-term 
contract, the so-called Yamal contract of 1996 (see below), li; s the ban on re-export of gas to third-party 
countries without Gazprom Export’s consent.
38 Without Montenegro and Albania, but with Croatia.
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OECD European average. However, the ratios were below the averages in coun-
tries of the second group, consisting of the Czech Republic (17.2%), Bulgaria 
(12.9%), Poland (12.6%), Slovenia (12%), Serbia (11.9%), and Estonia (10.1%). 
Finally, in countries, such as Macedonia (3.3%) and Bosnia-Herzegovina (3.1%) 
gas had an extremely low role in the coutries’ portfolio of energy sources.
/ at said, such & gures can change very quickly. For instance, for Latvia in 2009, 
gas played the greatest role in power generation among the countries examined. 
But by the end of 2009, Lithuania closed the Ignalina nuclear power plant, re-
sulting in a dramatic increase in gas’ role for generating electricity. Lithuania 
transitioned from a net electricity exporter to the country most dependent on 
electricity imports in the EU.39
3.2  Gas demand
In the CEE region, Poland (with 17.2 bcm in 2011), Romania (14.4 bcm), and 
Hungary (11.6 bcm) are the largest gas consumers, with a combined share of 
nearly 60 per cent in 2011.40 In 2009, in all countries under review, except for 
Albania, gas consumption decreased quite dramatically in certain cases (approx-
imately 30 to 40 per cent). Although in many countries gas demand reached its 
peak years before that.41
Forecasts for gas demand in the Central and Eastern European region are vague 
and varying. Only one forecast was available that analysed all of the countries 
examined. Anouk Honoré (of the Oxford Institute of Energy Studies), follow-
ing the IEA methodology, calculated in early 2010 that gas consumption in the 
15-country region would rise from 77.5 bcm in 2007 (and 75.8 bcm in 2008) to 
80.5 bcm in 2020. / is is a 4.7 bcm, or 6.2 per cent increase, which is predomi-
nantly due to Poland’s and Romania’s growth in consumption. Honoré forecasts 
a decline in half of the CEE countries (in Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Bulgaria, 
Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina).42
In an early 2012 report by Kantor Management Consultants, SA, in association 
with Booz and Company, a signi& cant increase in consumption is forecast by 
2020, compared to 2010 (which is also an estimate) for the region comprising 
39 V. Paskevicius, “Electricity Sector Development in Lithuania,” Forum “Energy in Latvia 2011,” December 7, 
2011, http://www.leea.lt/& les/2011-12-07prezentacija.ppt.
40 / e data also originates from the IEA.
41 Natural Gas Information 2008 (IEA, Paris, 2008); Natural Gas Information 2011 (IEA, Paris, 2011); 
Natural Gas Information 2012.
42 Honoré, xl, 243, 292, 293 294.
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eight CEE countries (Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Roma-
nia, Bulgaria, Croatia, and Slovenia). In the three scenarios— namely minimum, 
base, and maximum consumption— the & gures, respectively, are from 55.3 bcm 
in 2010 to 65.8 bcm in 2020 (+14.3%), from 55.7 bcm in 2010 to 76.7 bcm in 
2020 (+35.2%), and from 56.2 bcm in 2010 to 86.5 bcm in 2020 (+42.4%).43 
Honoré calculated much lower increases in the same eight countries. Practically, 
Honoré’s number (+14.2%) is, in relative terms, similar to that calculated by 
Kantor’s minimum (+14.3%). In Honoré’s predictions, the expectation is that 
all countries will increase consumption, from 63.7 bcm in 2010 (Honoré’s pro-
jection44) to 72.8 bcm in 2020 (i.e. even estimated base numbers or forecasted 
absolute numbers of the two forecasts di1 er greatly).
According to Honoré, in CEE countries south of Hungary, only a 0.7 bcm of 
additional gas demand will occur by 2020, compared to 2008 (from 25.4 bcm 
in 2008 to 26.1 bcm in 2020). Outside Romania growth will be barely notice-
able; rather, a decrease is anticipated. IHS CERA predicts 7.1 bcm of additional 
demand for gas in the same countries (from 23.5 bcm in 2008 to 30.6 bcm in 
2020). Romania and Croatia would account for nearly half of the increase; nev-
ertheless, the assumption is for additional demand in all countries.45
/ e & rst ten-year Gas Regional Investment Plans,46 prepared in accordance with 
the relevant Regulation of the EU’s / ird Energy Package, provide data over 
time for ten countries. Accordingly, among the three Baltic States, only Estonia 
will encounter a rise in consumption of gas from 2011 to 2021, while Latvia’s 
gas demand continues to decline. / e expectation for Lithuania is stagnation 
throughout the period. Among the remaining seven countries (Poland, the 
Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria and Croatia), by 2012, 
compared to 2011 levels, the lowest increase will be for Bulgaria, where pre-
dictions for demand suggest only a 3.5 per cent increase. Poland (92.5%), the 
Czech Republic (44.8%), and Hungary (32.7%) will represent the greatest in-
crease in demand by 2021, while gas consumption will grow below 20 per cent 
in Croatia (19.8%), Romania (19.7%), and Slovakia (16.2%).
43 Market Analysis and Priorities for Future Development of the Gas Market and Infrastructure in Central-
Eastern Europe under the North-South Energy Interconnections Initiative (Lot 2), Fiche vigie no 263, DG 
ENER/Unit B1. Final Report submitted to Directorate-General for Energy, Unit B1: Security of supply and 
networks, European Commission, January 19, 2012. 
44 2008 data (67.1 bcm) is factual, while 2009 data (60.7 bcm) is an estimate.
45 Cited by J. Roberts, “Energy in Central Asia: Drivers and Consequences,” (Presentation) Norwegian Insti-
tute of International A1 airs (NUPI), Oslo, February 22, 2012.
46 Gas Regional Investment Plans, http://www.gie.eu/memberarea/purtext_entsog_GRIP.asp?wa=plus_GRIP.
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3.3  Internal gas production in Central and Eastern Europe, with special 
attention to unconventional gas
In Central and Eastern Europe, only Romania (with 11.0 bcm in 2011) has sub-
stantial gas production, but gas production in Poland (6.2 bcm47), Croatia (2.3 
bcm), and Hungary (2.8 bcm) are also noteworthy.48 Romania and Croatia are 
largely self-su]  cient for natural gas supply, consuming 76.4 per cent and 71.9 
from domestic sources in 2011, respectively. Although not comparable to Ro-
mania and Croatia, in Poland (with 36% in 2011) and Hungary (24.1%) the 
ratio of gas consumption to production is not negligible. / is ratio is lower in 
Serbia (16.7%) and Bulgaria (15.2%), while others have only token degrees of 
self-su]  ciency (the Czech Republic – 2.2%, and Slovakia – 1.8%), or even none 
at all, in the rest of the CEE region.
Among unconventional gas resources, shale gas has attracted the most atten-
tion. However, shale gas production will be a more di]  cult matter in Europe 
than in the United States. / e CEE region has taken the & rst steps to access this 
resource, and the & rst failures have occurred. Poland remains the best prospect 
for shale gas production. Nevertheless, recently, several reports are negative, be-
ginning with the latest assessments predicting resources from shale gas, which 
may be much lower than originally estimated in the widely circulated April 2011 
report of the Energy Information Administration (EIA) of the U.S. Department 
of Energy. Despite estimates from the March 2012 report of the Polish Geologi-
cal Institute, the report of the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) published in July 
2010 depicts a negative picture. While some companies yielded disappointing 
results from drilling for shale gas, any & rm conclusion may be too early. Further 
negative reports in June 2012 suggested a disappointed U.S. “supermajor” com-
pany, Exxon Mobil, still in early stages of exploration in Poland, would termi-
nate its shale gas exploration projects.49 Governmental projects in Poland expect 
to begin commercial production of shale gas in late 2014 or early 2015.
In January 2012, Bulgaria prevented another U.S. supermajor corporation, 
Chevron, from continuing shale gas projects. Protests throughout the country 
that objected to the technology of fracking for shale gas exploration and ex-
traction resulted in the termination of Chevron’s exploration permit. In Poland 
(and Lithuania), Chevron has opportunities for results; however, Romania’s new 
government marks an end to the country’s pro-shale gas position. A moratorium 
47 Compare with other data sources. For example, according to national sources, domestic gas production was 
4.3 bcm in 2011, which is the same as that of BP (BP Statistical Review of World Energy).
48 According to IEA’s de& nition of gas production.
49 Natural Gas Europe, June 16, 2012, http://www.naturalgaseurope.com/exxon-withdraws-poland-shale-gas.
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is e1 ectively in place in spite of, so far, a lack of adopted, relevant legislation to 
implement such restrictions.50 According to an August 2012 statement by the 
Romanian Minister of Environment and Forests, Romania will most likely ex-
tend the moratorium by two years until 2014. However, Romania’s hope is not 
shale gas but rather gas in the Black Sea. Similarly, the same resource provides 
Bulgaria with an optimistic possibility. In the Czech Republic, an expected mor-
atorium on shale gas exploration is likely, at least by mid-2014, but legislation is 
not yet o]  cial. Here, concerns for revoking licenses and local objections, rather 
than proceeding with projects were o; en raised.
Among the Baltic States, Lithuania has aspirations to join those seeking shale 
gas. In the summer of 2012, Lithuania, a; er initial postponement, approved its 
& rst tender for shale gas exploration; however, no company in Lithuania engages 
in exploration of shale oil and shale gas. Latvia has announced plans to diversify 
its energy sources by exploring the development of shale gas resources,51 but fur-
ther information is currently absent.
Unconventional gas in Hungary’s Makó Trough initially attracted interest, but 
the exploratory drilling has been unsuccessful. However, Hungary’s oil and gas 
company, Mol, produces gas from unconventional reservoirs in Hungary. Final-
ly, the potential of Hungary’s former Yugoslav neighbours for unconventional 
gas is worth mentioning, too.
4. Transit through the western CIS states and Central and Eastern 
Europe
/ e bulk of exported Russian gas to consumers outside the former Soviet Un-
ion transits three western CIS states, Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova. In addi-
tion, Finland also has interconnections with Russia. Delivery of a signi& cant 
portion of Turkish exports began via the Blue Stream pipeline in the Black Sea 
and, in 2011, via the Nord Stream pipeline in the Baltic Sea. / e direction of gas 
pipelines through Ukraine to Europe tends toward Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, 
50 Natural Gas Europe, August 16, 2012, http://www.naturalgaseurope.com/shale-gas-exploitation-in-
romania-postponed; T. Dborowski and J. Groszkowski, “Shale gas in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic and 
Romania. Political context – legal status – outlook,” OSW Report (Centre for Eastern Studies, Warsaw, 
September 2012), http://www.osw.waw.pl/sites/default/& les/Shale_gas_in_Bulgaria_the_Czech_Re-
public_and_Romania_net.pdf; Natural Gas Europe, June 25, 2012, http://www.naturalgaseurope.com/
romania-senate-rejects-fracking-ban; Transindex, June 21, 2012, http://itthon.transindex.ro/?hir=29748.
51 / e Baltic Course, February 24, 2011, http://www.baltic-course.com/eng/good_for_business/?doc=37695; 
Natural Gas Europe, July 21, 2011, http://www.naturalgaseurope.com/latvia-pursue-shale-gas-develop-
ment.
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Romania, and Moldova. Gas J ows through Moldova to Romania, with Bela-
rus providing transit service in the direction of Lithuania, Poland, and Ukraine. 
In 2011, 101 bcm of gas transited to Europe through Ukraine, while 44 bcm 
J owed through Belarus and nearly 20 bcm through Moldova. Among the three 
western CIS transit states, Gazprom owns the Belarusian section of the Yamal-
Europe pipeline, carrying Russian gas to Poland and Germany, and the trunk 
pipeline network of Belarus’ Beltransgaz. In Moldova, Gazprom retains half of 
the shares in Moldovagaz, including transmission pipelines. Gazprom has no 
position in Ukraine.
A; er expiring at the end of 2011, Moldovagaz has not succeeded in acquiring 
new, long(er)-term gas supply and transit contracts with Gazprom. Instead, ex-
tensions to existing contracts occurred several times, the last until the end of 
2012. / e lack of consent largely relates the EU Energy Community Ministerial 
Council’s adoption of the EU’s / ird Energy Package in October 2011. Due to 
its shareholding in Moldovagaz, Gazprom strongly opposes the / ird Energy 
Package, in particular the so-called unbundling. Ultimately, Moldova, pressed 
by Russia, has decided to postpone the implementation of new contracts.
Transiting gas through Russia is not without cost. In 2009, Russia withdrew 
from the Energy Charter Treaty, thereby terminating its position as a Contract-
ing Party. Ukraine and Moldova rati& ed the Energy Charter Treaty, but Belarus 
has not. / e agreement on the CIS free trade zone, signed in October 2011 by 
eight nations, is in e1 ect in four countries, but the issue of freedom of transit by 
pipelines awaits a solution.
In the CEE region, the three main transit routes are through Slovakia, Poland, 
and Romania. Gas transit through Slovakia reached a peak of nearly 85 bcm 
in 1999. / e Yamal-Europe gas pipeline, commissioned in 1999, reduced the 
signi& cance of Slovakia, while Poland became an important transit country to 
Germany. In 2011, 25 bcm of gas entered Germany through this pipeline whose 
capacity is 32.9 bcma.52,53 Slovakia’s agreement, signed in November 2008, con-
tracts a 20–year term, for transporting 50 bcma of gas.54 In 2011, 47.4 bcm of 
gas transited the pipeline.55 An extension of the Czech Republic’s RWE Trans-
52 Slovak Republic: Energy Policy Review 2005 (IEA, Paris, 2005), 140; OilCapital.ru, April 23, 2012, 
http://www.oilcapital.ru/transport/155258.html.
53 Implementing the third energy package, in Poland, the owner of the Polish section of the Yamal-Europe gas 
pipeline (EuRoPol GAZ) handed over operation, and the Polish state-owned company Gaz-System became 
the independent system operator (ISO) in 2010. / e unbundling is a serious source of conJ ict with Russia. 
It also concerns existing assets with Russian ownership.
54 Gazprom Export, http://www.gazpromexport.ru/en/partners/slovakia/.
55 A. Medvedev, “Gazprom and Slovakia: Anniversaries of Cooperation in Energy Sector,” Speech by Alex-
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gas agreement with Gazprom through 2035 contracts for a maximum 30.5 bcma 
of gas. Moreover, the operational schedule of the new transit pipeline, Gazelle, 
through the Czech Republic with a capacity of 30-33 bcma is January 2013. Ga-
zelle is a continuation of Germany’s OPAL gas pipeline of 35 bcma of capacity 
and, thus, part of the wider Nord Stream project. Gazelle will transport Russian 
gas delivered through the Nord Stream pipeline in the Baltic Sea. Romania’s 
Transgaz has two transit contracts with Gazprom (one from 1987 and extended 
to 2012, the other from 1999 and valid until 2023), but data for quantities is 
unavailable.56 In 2006, an extension of the Bulgarian contract to 2030 provides 
for transit volumes of 17.8 bcma (with an option to an additional 5 bcma).57 In 
2011, Bulgaria transited 15 bcm: 80 per cent to Turkey, 19 per cent to Greece, 
and one per cent to Macedonia.58
Ukraine’s neighbours will (or could) & nd themselves in a new role as provid-
ers of transmission services to Ukraine. / e Ukrainians approached Hungary 
to explore the possibility of a physical supply to Ukraine, and perhaps by to-
day, both technical and legal advances allow for the pumping of gas to Ukraine 
from Hungary.59 Since the Ukrainian partner must purchase gas from a foreign 
source, a transit system is an issue. / e Slovakian transmission system’s opera-
tor (TSO), Eustream, has considered construction of a new bi-directional inter-
connection between the gas transmission systems of Slovakia and Ukraine, but, 
as announced in October 2012, the Open Season had not identi& ed su]  cient 
binding market interest in new transmission capacities.60,61
4.1 Bypass pipelines and their e* ect on transit
/ e & rst line of the Nord Stream gas pipeline, which cost EUR 7.4 billion with 
a capacity of 27.5 bcma, became operational in November 2011. In October 
ander Medvedev at the 50th anniversary of the Druzhba oil pipeline in Slovakia, Bratislava, September 18, 
2012.
56 Transgaz: Let the gas fl ow, ING, July 16, 2008, http://www.transgaz.ro/Downloads/rapoarte_analisti/
ING%20Report%20Transgaz%20company%20note.pdf; Annual Director’s Report 2011, Transgaz, 2011, 
http://www.transgaz.ro/en/Downloads/Situatii_& nanciare/Raportul_administratorilor_2011_en.pdf.
57 Gazprom Export, http://www.gazpromexport.ru/en/partners/bulgaria/.
58 Manager.bg, September 30, 2012, http://www.manager.bg/news/357-mln-evro-v-ochakvane-na-nabuko% 
E2%80%9C-i-yuzhen-potok%E2%80%9C.
59 According to information provided to the author by FGSZ CEO János Zsuga.
60 Eustream – News, June 19, 2012 http://www.eustream.sk/en_media/en_news/binding-open-season-for-
the-sk-ua-gas-interconnector; Eustream News, October 15, 2012, http://www.eustream.sk/en_media/
en_news/open-season-for-the-sk-ua-interconnector-evaluated.
61 Following completion of this study, & nally, for the & rst time gas deliveries to Ukraine from the west by re-
verse J ow were managed. RWE started to supply physical gas J ows to Ukraine from/through Poland, while 
Ukraine reduced its purchases from Russia below the take or pay minimum.
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2012, the second line of the Nord Stream gas pipeline opened. Shareholders 
of the Nord Stream AG consortium, including Gazprom, Wintershall Holding 
(of the German BASF Group), E.ON Ruhrgas, Gasunie (of the Netherlands), 
and GDF Suez (of France), considered adding a third and a fourth line, and the 
preliminary feasibility study reports that the construction of these lines is eco-
nomically expedient and technically possible. Before the end of January 2013, 
the consortium plans to sign a memorandum promoting construction of new 
capacities, with one line possibly serving Great Britain.62
/ e expectation there will be a high rate of utilization for the Nord Stream 
pipeline, since Gazprom signed ship or pay contracts for 100 per cent of the 55 
bcma capacity. However, since November 2011, the & rst line has only carried 
a moderate load, about one-third of the available capacity. A; er the pipeline 
reaches 100 per cent capacity, the tari1  per transmission of 1,000 cubic meters 
of gas, 100 kilometres, will be higher than that of the Ukrainian line.63 Chyong, 
Noёl, and Reiner (2010) concluded that the unit cost of shipping through Nord 
Stream is lower than using the Ukrainian route and is only slightly above ship-
ping through the Yamal-Europe pipeline.64 
/ e South Stream pipeline through the Black Sea will provide capacity for 63 
bcma, and consists of four lanes, each of them with a capacity of 15.75 bcma. 
Gazprom, ENI, Wintershall Holding, and EDF (of France) are the members 
of the South Stream Transport AG consortium, which has the responsibility 
of studying, constructing, and operating the o1 shore section of the pipeline. 
Gazprom’s November 2010 announcement reported that the o1 shore segment 
of the pipeline may cost EUR 10 billion, while the price of the onshore segment 
in Europe is EUR 5.5 billion.65 According to Wintershall, the estimated invest-
ments necessary for the o1 shore sections are at least EUR 10 billion, while costs 
of EUR 20-25 billion represent the estimates for the project overall (onshore 
and o1 shore).66 However, Russian involvement is not ignored: A signi& cant 
amount of both the Nord Stream and the South Stream pipeline is constructed 
in Russia. 
62 RIA Novosti, October 8, 2012, http://ria.ru/economy/20121008/769142388.html, http://en.rian.ru/
business/20121008/176482137.html.
63 Kyiv Post, September 6, 2012, http://www.kyivpost.com/content/ukraine/nord-stream-tari1 -still-double-
that-of-ukrainian-transit-312571.html.
64 C.K. Chyong, P. NoQ64l, and D.M. Reiner, / e Economics of the Nord Stream Pipeline System, EPRG 
Working Paper, Electricity Policy Research Group, University of Cambridge, No. 1026, 2010.
65 Korporativniy Zhurnal OAO «Gazprom», No. 11/2010, 9.
66 “Insurance policy for Europe,” Interview with CEO Rainer Seele about the European natural gas pipeline, 
Wintershall, http://www.wintershall.com/en/insurance-policy-for-europe.html.
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According to Putin’s recommendation, publicized at the end of December 
2011, the construction of South Stream will begin at the end of 2012 (at least 
o]  cially),67 with commissioning projected for the end of 2015 and commercial 
deliveries to begin in the & rst quarter of 2016.68 Bulgaria is the planned land 
entry point of the pipelines from the Black Sea, while it will pass through the 
Turkish exclusive economic zone in the Black Sea. Gazprom waited an extended 
period for Turkey to issue the permit for South Stream construction as a number 
of uncertainties involved the land route of the pipeline. / e & nal investment 
decisions are scheduled for October and November 2012. 
/ e earlier plans envisaged two branches of the South Stream pipeline, a north-
ern and a southern route beginning in Bulgaria; however, the agenda removed 
the southern branch. During the presentation of the project in Brussels in May 
2011, Gazprom suggested four options for the route of the South Stream gas 
pipeline, with Romania as one of the routes. However, Romania did not join 
the South Stream project (because it issued no intergovernmental agreement) 
although the country conducted a feasibility study for building a possible sec-
tion through its territory. A new development, in May 2012, was Gazprom’s cor-
porate magazine announcing that gas would traverse Bulgaria, Serbia, Hungary, 
and Slovenia to northeast Italy, and plans include building a subsection to link 
the Bosnian Serb Republic and Croatia through Serbia, Greece, and Bulgaria. 
/ e announcement included other states, such as Macedonia and Montenegro, 
but le;  unmentioned plans for expanding into Austria and southern Italy.69 
Austria’s failure to purchase shares in the Central European Gas Hub (CEGH) 
signi& cantly inJ uenced Gazprom’s exclusion of the country. For the northern 
branch, the preparations have not gone smoothly in the other countries ei-
ther. / e projects were beset with problems, not only in Bulgaria (enjoying the 
strongest bargaining position) but also in Hungary, and in August 2012 news 
suggested Croatia could replace Hungary.
Europe faced gas supply interruptions in conduits that pass through the western 
CIS transit states four times over the 2000s, two in Belarus and two in Ukraine. 
While interruption of gas supplies through Ukraine a1 ects all CEE buyers ex-
cept the Baltic States, interruption of the Belarusian transit is a serious problem 
for Lithuania and Poland.
67 RIA Novosti, December 30, 2011, http://ria.ru/economy/20111230/529997206.html.
68 Korporativniy Zhurnal OAO «Gazprom», No. 5/2012.
69 Following completion of the study, Austria’s, Greece’s, and southern Italy’s exclusion from construction plans 
for the South Stream pipeline became certain.
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Nord Stream helps to balance the inJ uence of Russia and, equally importantly, 
Ukraine against the EU’s other gas suppliers.70 / e Nord Stream pipeline has 
caused reductions in the Ukrainian transit, which consequently reduces transit 
through Slovakia and the Czech Republic, and in the transit fees for these states. 
However, transit through the Czech Republic will encounter further di]  culty 
from the Nord Stream pipeline, because upon completion Gazelle will increase 
transit through the Czech Republic. In May 2011, six months prior to com-
missioning Nord Stream, Miller said the plan included redirecting 20 bcm of 
gas in transit to Europe via Ukraine to Nord Stream. / e amount of gas is just 
under one-& ; h of what Ukraine transported to Europe in 2010 and 2011.71 / e 
aim of the redirection is apparent from the November 2008 contract between 
Gazprom and Slovak TSO Eustream72 and from data obtained from Eustream. 
According to Mikhail Korchemkin, Gazprom is unlikely to ful& l its transit con-
tract with Eustream.73 However, Slovakia’s position is secure by the ship or pay 
provision. At the same time, the 2009 transit contract between Ukraine and 
Russia does not contain ship or pay obligation, so Gazprom can lower volumes 
without facing penalties. Belarus and consequently Poland are in a much safer 
positions than Ukraine, since Gazprom has full ownership of the Belarusian gas 
pipelines. In fact, Gazprom could increase transits through Belarus at the ex-
pense of Ukraine.
South Stream has the potential to signi& cantly impact transit. According to the 
May 2011 announcement, it will add very large capacities by & lling the pipe-
line’s capacity by two-thirds, completing existing contracts and reinforcing the 
pipeline’s role as a bypass. But despite South Stream, Bulgaria’s Prime Minis-
ter explained in July 2010 that Gazprom would continue to transit the same 
amounts of natural gas through Bulgaria to Greece and Turkey using the exist-
ing pipelines.74
In June 2011, Alexei Miller emphasized that the implementation of the Nord 
Stream and South Stream projects represents the pursuit of a noble aim to com-
pletely eliminate the risks that threaten the transit of Russian gas to Europe.75 In 
February 2012, during intense debate Gazprom stated that the South Stream’s 
full capacity and Nord Stream, together with additional lines and existing ca-
pacity through Belarus and the Black Sea, would reduce Ukraine’s importance 
70 Reuters, November 7, 2011, http://in.reuters.com/article/2011/11/07/idINIndia-60372320111107.
71 Reuters, May 25, 2011, http://ru.reuters.com/article/idUKLDE74O27O20110525?sp=true.
72 East European Gas Analysis, February 15, 2011, http://eegas.com/south-str-2011-02e-15.htm.
73 East European Gas Analysis, July 2, 2012, http://www.eegas.com/slovakia-eustream.htm.
74 Novinite.com, July 10, 2010, http://www.novinite.com/view_news.php?id=117974.
75 Gazprom, press conference, http://www.gazprom.com/f/posts/94/248065/gazprom-& nal-press-conf-
2011-06-30-en.pdf.
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for transit to zero.76 / e pessimistic scenario embodied in the updated dra;  of 
the Energy Strategy of Ukraine for the period through 2030 envisions drastic 
decline in transit.
5.  : e role of Russian gas in Central and Eastern European countries
On 4 February 2011, the European Council concluded that no EU Member 
State should remain isolated from the European gas networks a; er 2015 or jeop-
ardize its energy security because of a lack of appropriate connections. Accord-
ing to the October 2010 EU regulation concerning measures to safeguard the 
security of gas supplies, with some exceptions the transmission systems’ opera-
tors must enable permanent bi-directional capacity on all cross-border intercon-
nections between member states by December 2013 at the latest. / e European 
Commission’s November 2010 communication on energy infrastructure priori-
ties identi& ed priority projects in the CEE region: the North-South Corridor in 
Central Eastern and South-East Europe, the Southern Corridor and the Baltic 
Energy Market Interconnection Plan (BEMIP). Building gas interconnections 
has been a long-standing, unresolved issue in Central and Eastern Europe, but it 
has recently progressed to a degree. 
Central and Eastern European countries have attempted to interrupt, or at least 
ease, Russia’s domination, but reports indicate very few results. / e January 2009 
gas crisis and the emergence of the “two price” or “hybrid price” market (i.e. the 
relatively very expensive Russian contracted gas prices, compared to spot prices) 
provided new impetus. Market segmentation has always been a signi& cant ad-
vantage for Gazprom (the possibility to execute price discrimination), but while 
some assert that Gazprom tried to prevent diversi& cation or the free J ow of gas, 
the lack of diversi& cation could have simple economic explanations, such as the 
price of Russian gas, compared to other options. Another consideration is the 
discounted prices from the Baltic States that ended in 2008, thus ensuring equal 
pro& tability, compared to the European markets, and the practice of “gas for 
transit” had to be abolished in the Central and Eastern European transit states. 
In some countries, legislation requires a minimum level of diversi& cation. Po-
land, in 2000, established annually through 2020 the maximum share of im-
ported gas from one country of origin relative to the total volume of imported 
gas. / e regulation applies to all wholesalers buying gas from abroad. In Lithua-
76 Reuters, February 22, 2012, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/02/22/russia-ukraine-gas-idUSL5E8D 
MAU920120222; “Gazprom Gas Pipeline Projects Mean ‘Zero’ Need for Ukraine,” Bloomberg, February 
22, 2012, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-02-22/gazprom-sees-zero-need-for-ukraine-gas-transit-
with-new-links.html.
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nia, the LNG terminal project dictates minimum limits to diversi& cation and 
requires at least 25 per cent of the country’s natural gas needs to be purchased 
via the terminal.77 In Bulgaria, the government’s main objective is to prevent a 
single supplier from having a market share greater than 50 per cent by 2020 (or 
earlier).78
Various types of intermediaries have been involved in gas import and trade. 
Eural Trans Gas, registered and operated in Hungary as an o1 shore business en-
tity, and the Swiss-based Rosukrenergo comprise just two intermediaries. Some 
joint ventures such as Panrusgáz in Hungary, Yugorosgaz in Serbia, or Overgaz 
in Bulgaria have registration in these particular countries. In Bulgaria and Ro-
mania, intermediaries such as WIEE also operate.79 
Interpretation of statistics for gas imports to each country are very di1 erent, 
thus without explanation, they can be misleading. For example, BP indicates 
in its statistics that J ows are on a contractual basis and may not correspond to 
physical gas J ows in all cases. Importantly, the physical J ow of gas can be dif-
ferent from the commercial J ow of gas. In such cases, the two J ows appear in 
records as if gas volumes purchased had come physically to a particular point. 
For example, delivery of gas does not move physically from Germany to Hun-
gary or from Austria (Baumgarten an der March) to France by long-term gas 
supply contracts with E.ON Ruhrgas and GDF Suez, respectively.
Among the Central and Eastern European countries, only Estonia and Latvia 
receive gas from Russia without transit through intermediate countries. Lithua-
nia is not only dependent on transit through Belarus but also provides transit to 
Russia’s exclave Kaliningrad Oblast. Latvia’s underground gas storage facility has 
a signi& cant role in the region; during the winter, this gas storage supplies not 
only Latvia’s consumers but also Estonia, Lithuania, and back to Russia. Expan-
sion of interconnected supplies between Latvia and Lithuania is in progress.80
77 15min.lt, June 12, 2012, http://www.15min.lt/en/article/business/lithuanian-parliament-approves-lng-
terminal-construction-527-225787.
78 Ministry of Economy, Energy and Tourism of the Republic of Bulgaria, http://www.mi.government.bg/
bg/interviews-type-detail-21-.html; 24chasa.bg, November 24, 2011, http://www.24chasa.bg/Article.
asp?ArticleId=1125602
79 Wintershall Erdgas Handelshaus Zug AG (WIEE) is a subsidiary of the Berlin-based Wintershall Erdgas 
Handelshaus GmbH & Co. KG (WIEH), which is, in turn, is a joint venture of Gazprom and Wintershall.
80 Gazprom has stakes in all three “national” gas companies (in Estonia ’s Eesti Gaas, Latvia’s Latvijas Gze, and 
Lithuania’s Lietuvos Dujos) of the three Baltic States, respectively; therefore, unbundling a1 ects these assets. 
Among the three Baltic States, Lithuania was the & rst to nationalize its transmission system. In June 2011, 
Lithuania’s parliament voted in favor of unbundling full ownership by approving separation of the country’s 
gas transportation and supply assets. / e government, in October 2011, set an October 2014 deadline for 
the unbundling. Since announcing the reorganization in spring 2010, the dispute between Lithuania and 
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/ e three Baltic States do not have interconnections with Central Europe as 
they purchase gas only from Russia. In Estonia, only Eesti Gaas imports gas, ac-
cording to contracts with Gazprom valid through 2015. Previously, the fertilizer 
producer Nitrofert purchased gas directly from Gazprom, but in February 2009 
Nitrofert suspended production due to high gas prices and, consequently, drasti-
cally reduced Estonia’s imports of gas. Eesti Gaas also purchases gas from Latvia’s 
Itera Latvija but in small quantities. According to a 2009 presentation by Itera, 
in 2008 a chain of gas sales that followed the path of gas originating with Itera 
arrived from Gazprom Export and transfered to Eesti Gaas and Latvijas Gāze. 
Itera has a long-term contract to supply 0.6 bcma of gas to Latvia through 2030, 
while supplies to Estonia are only 0.1 bcma.81 In Latvia, Latvijas Gāze handles 
all import operations on the basis of a long-term contract with a consortium of 
Latvijas Gāze, Gazprom, and Itera Latvija.82 In February 2009, Latvijas Gaze 
and Gazprom extended the contract, previously due to expire in 2015, to 2030.
Gazprom exports gas to & ve companies in Lithuania: the vertically integrated gas 
company Lietuvos Dujos, the nitrogen fertilizer producer Achema, the gas trad-
ing company Dujotekana (the second largest gas supplier to both wholesale and 
retail markets), the Kaunas power plant (“Kauno termo& kacijos elektrinė”), and 
Haupas, which supplies gas to the Druskininkai region. Since October 2008, 
Gazprom has supplied gas through the intermediary LT Gas Stream AG to Du-
jotekana, whose contract is e1 ective through the end of 2012. / e contract with 
Haupas lasts until 2013,83 while those with Lietuvos Dujos and Achema remain 
until 2015,84 and, according to Lithuania’s Energy Ministry, contracts with Kau-
no termo& kacijos elektrinė will last until 2017.85 Obviously, several contracts for 
supplying gas remain, and arguably prices di1 er; for example, Achema purchases 
gas at a lower price than Lietuvos Dujos.86
Russia became intense, with national courts, arbitral tribunals, and the involvement of the European Com-
mission. In early June 2012, Estonia’s parliament also legislated unbundling. Accordingly, Eesti Gaas must 
sell its natural gas transportation network before the end of 2014, and the government must approve the sale. 
In April 2012, Latvia announced its intention to unbundle Latvijas Gaze’s monopoly, with a deadline of no 
later than 2017.
81 J. Henderson, Non-Gazprom Gas Producers in Russia, Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, Oxford, 70.
82 2010 Annual Report of the Public Utilities Commission of the Republic of Latvia on the National Energy 
Sector, Prepared for the European Commission, 2011.
83 Annual Report on Electricity and Natural Gas Markets of the Republic of Lithuania to the European Com-
mission, Prepared by the National Control Commission for Prices and Energy, Vilnius, 2012.
84 The Lithuania Tribune, February 25, 2012, http://www.lithuaniatribune.com/2012/02/25/achemas-lead-
er-says-pms-letter-was-not-the-reason-for-cheaper-gas-supply/; The Lithuania Tribune, October 22, 2012, 
http://www.lithuaniatribune.com/2012/10/22/gazprom-has-strong-commercial-reasons-to-maintain-its-
current-pricing-in-europe-russian-expert/.
85 Energetikos ministerijos ekstremalisjs situacijs valdymo planas, Lietuvos Respublikos energetikos minis-
terija, Vilnius, 2012, http://www.enmin.lt/lt/activity/kita/EM_Ekstremaliu_situaciju_valdymo_planas.
pdf. According to this report, Haupas  contract ends in 2015.
86 15min.lt, July 4, 2012, http://www.15min.lt/en/article/politics/ethics-commission-clears-lithuanian-
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/ e Baltic States have been unable to agree on a regional LNG terminal; there-
fore, they turned to the European Commission to determine the proper loca-
tion. Lithuania, however, insisting on an exclusive facility, signed, in early March 
2012, a lease agreement for a J oating lique& ed natural gas storage and regasi& ca-
tion unit (FSRU). In mid-June 2012, the Lithuanian parliament adopted legis-
lation concerning the terminal,87 but contracts for supply are pending.
While the deadline for the LNG terminal is the end of 2014, expected com-
missioning of the interconnection between Poland and Lithuania (GIPL) will 
not occur until the late 2010s. / e feasibility study is due for completion in the 
& rst quarter of 2013. / e Balticconnector between Finland and Estonia remains 
in the planning phase, and in principle, a & nal decision is expected to occur in 
2013-2014.
Poland has the opportunity to purchase gas from the east, west, and south, but 
the southern and western borders have limited capacities. Some of the cross-
border pipelines only supply local needs (the transmission grid does not include 
gas). 
Poland can physically receive gas
• from the east through Belarus (through two entry points from the Bel-
transgaz network, one entry point through the Yamal-Europe gas pipe-
line) and from/through Ukraine (through two entry points), 
• from the west from/through Germany (through three entry points), 
and
• from the south from/through the Czech Republic (through three entry 
points).88
prime-minister-of-conJ ict-of-interest-suspicions-526-231422.
87 15min.lt, June 12, 2012, http://www.15min.lt/en/article/business/lithuanian-parliament-approves-lng-
terminal-construction-527-225787.
88 PGNiG, https://www.pgnig.pl/binSrc?docId=34683&paramName=BINARYOBJ_FILE&index=0&lan
guage=EN&forceSave=yes; Report on the Results of Monitoring the Security of Gaseous Fuel Supply for 
the Period from 1 January 2010 to 31 December 2010, Minister of Economy, Warsaw, 2011, http://www.
mg.gov.pl/& les/upload/8356/sprawozdanie%20za%202010%20r.%20-%20ang..pdf; Feasibility Study: 
Cross-border Gas Pipeline for Improving the Logistics in Central and Eastern Europe, Gazoprojekt, Polish 
Chamber of Chemical Industry, November 2010, http://www.central2013.eu/& leadmin/user_upload/
Downloads/outputlib/Chemlog_feasibility_study_Poland_uploaded.pdf.
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Recently, Poland’s import possibilities from the non-eastern directions have in-
creased by 3.3 bcma, representing about 30 per cent of current imports. First, 
since November 2011, virtual reverse J ow service on the Yamal-Europe gas 
pipeline has become possible (with a volume up to approximately 2.3 bcma). 
Second, since January 2012, import capacity from Germany through Lasów has 
increased by about 0.5 bcma to 1.5 bcma.89 / ird, in September 2011, a new 
cross-border gas pipeline, STORK, opened between Poland and the Czech Re-
public, with a capacity of 0.5 bcma in the & rst phase (Cieszyn entry point). (/ e 
deadline for the STORK II project is 2017.)90
In 2011, 9.3 bcm of gas, or 85 per cent of imports to Poland, were purchased 
according to a long-term contract with Russia, while 1.6 bcm arrived (mostly) 
from Germany and (in small volumes) from the Czech Republic. Domestic pro-
duction of 4.3 bcm of gas supplemented these imports.91 While other countries 
had concerns for having contracted for excess volumes of gas, Poland’s attention 
in 2009–2010 was focused on adjusting a negative balance between contracted 
and delivered volumes, which was caused by the elimination of the intermediary 
Rosukrenergo in early 2009. A; er a short-term 2009 contract, a 2010 adden-
dum to the existing long-term contract allowed increased gas purchases. / is 
step expanded Gazprom’s role in Poland’s gas supplies; however, the expiration 
of the contract remained for 2022 rather than 2037 as requested. / e earlier 
date is advantageous, since it allows evaluation of shale gas potential and other 
options. Due to the high oil-indexed contract prices of Russia’s gas, PGNiG 
planned, in March 2012, to minimise purchases that year to the contracted take 
or pay level (85%) and supply the remaining need through the interconnections 
with Germany, the Czech Republic, and the virtual reverse on the Yamal-Europe 
gas pipeline.92
/ e 1990s produced a stream of diversi& cation announcements regarding gas 
piped from Netherlands, Norway, and Denmark to Poland. Despite negotia-
tions and contracts, only a “small contract” provided supply from Norway of 0.5 
bcma for 2000 to 2006.93 Poland had received gas from Germany and the Czech 
89 Total import capacity available from Germany, including capacities for local needs, is minimally more than 
actual capacities.
90 Gaz-System – News, January 10, 2012, http://en.gaz-system.pl/press-centre/news/information-for-the-
media/artykul/201338.html.
91 National Report 2012, / e President of the Energy Regulatory O]  ce in Poland (URE), 2012. Compare 
with data given by, for example, the IEA (6.2 bcm in 2011).
92 Reuters, March 20, 2012, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/03/20/pgnig-gazprom-idU.S.L6E8EK 
2PY20120320; Bloomberg, March 20, 2012, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-03-20/pgnig-plans-
to-cut-gazprom-gas-purchases-to-85-of-upper-limit.html.
93 J. Stern, The Future of Russian Gas and Gazprom, Oxford University Press for the Oxford Institute of 
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Republic in the 1990s but only a very small amount for local needs. Before 
2009, & rst from Eural Trans Gas and then from Rosukrenergo, Poland achieved 
a speci& c diversi& cation from the east. Also, Ukraine’s Na; ohaz provided a very 
small quantity of gas for local needs under a long-term contract, signed in 2004, 
for a period ending in 2020, but Ukraine recently suspended deliveries. Once 
completed in 2014, the regasi& cation terminal will create a new dimension for 
Poland. To date, only one agreement, with Qatar, will supply 1 mmtpa of LNG 
for 20 years. As to the missing link for gas with neighbouring Slovakia, signing a 
letter of intent in January 2011 initiated cooperation for the development of an 
interconnection between Poland and Slovakia. / e feasibility study, scheduled 
for early 2013, precedes the in-principle deadline for completion of the pipeline 
in 2017. / e interconnection between Denmark and Poland, the Baltic Pipe, 
could connect the Norwegian–Swedish–Danish Skanled gas pipeline project 
(the latter suspended in 2009); however, the date for commissioning has been 
rescheduled for 2020 (depending on the market interest).
Under normal circumstances, gas physically enters Slovakia from Ukraine and 
leaves Slovakia for transmission to the Czech Republic (Lanžhot) and Aus-
tria (Baumgarten).94 During the January 2009 gas crisis, for the & rst time, gas 
entered Slovakia from the west to the east (i.e. physical J ow of gas transited 
through the Lanžhot border transfer station, however, only in small amounts).95 
/ e Slovak transmission network is now able to transport gas from the west to 
the east in standard operating mode.96 Another Austrian–Slovak gas pipeline, 
the Kittsee-Petržalka gas pipeline (KIP), commissioned in 2009, is available for 
emergencies. / e gas crisis prompted swi;  completion of KIP, with only a few 
Energy Studies, Oxford, 2005, 116.; Statoil.ru, http://www.statoil.ru/statoilcom/inf/svg01429.nsf/html/
e1999_1999gas.
94 Slovakia’s Mokrý Háj is an entry point into the inland transmission system of the Czech Republic (and 
not into the transit system). Mokrý Háj connects the Czech system with the Láb underground gas storage 
facility in Slovakia. However, an additional cross-border pipeline between Slovakia and the Czech Republic 
exists. A storage facility in the Czech Republic at Dolní Bojanovice directly connects the Slovak system. 
(Energy Policies of IEA Countries: / e Slovak Republic: 2012 Review (IEA, Paris, 2012); The Czech Gas 
Industry: Facts and Figures, Energy Regulatory O]  ce of the Czech Republic (ERU), http://www.eru.cz/
user_data/& les/plyn/40_Statistic/charakteristikaEN.pdf.
95 Gas Crisis in January 2009 – Review and Outlook, SPP, a.s., Bratislava, January 27, 2009, http://www.
spp.sk/download/presskit/2009-01-27-SPP-Presskit-ENG-& nal-WEB.pdf; The Czech Republic’s National 
Report on the Electricity and Gas Industries for 2009, Energy Regulatory O]  ce of the Czech Republic, 
July 2010, http://www.energy-regulators.eu/portal/page/portal/EER_HOME/EER_PUBLICATIONS/
NATIONAL_REPORTS/National%20Reporting%202010/NR_En/E10_NR_CzechRep-EN.pdf; The 
January 2009 Gas Supply Disruption to the EU: An Assessment, Brussels, SEC(2009) 977 & nal, July 16, 
2009, http://ec.europa.eu/energy/strategies/2009/doc/sec_2009_0977.pdf.
96 Eustream – News, November 30, 2011, http://www.eustream.sk/en_media/en_press-releases/reverse-
J ow-project-is-completed.
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metres of pipeline missing on the Slovakian side.97 Among its neighbours, Slo-
vakia has no interconnection with Poland and Hungary. As opposed to the non-
binding phase in 2009, the binding phase of the Open Season process for the 
development of the interconnection between Slovakia and Hungary yielded un-
successful results twice in 2010. Subsequently, Hungary’s state-owned electric-
ity company MVM Group replaced Hungary’s TSO FGSZ, owned by Mol, and 
operates as an ITO (independent transmission operator) for the project. Now, 
MVM and MFB Invest, the latter is a subsidiary of Hungary’s state-owned MFB 
Hungarian Development Bank, equally own the pipeline and are responsible for 
the project. / e pipeline would begin operations in January 2015.
Before 2004, Gazprom was the sole external gas supplier for Slovakia. Alter-
native supplies from Norway or the Netherlands gained consideration in the 
second half of the 1990s but did not materialise.98 In the end, Eural Trans Gas 
and then Rosukrenergo remained as options. SPP and Gazprom Export signed a 
new long-term gas supply contract in November 2008 to begin in January 2009, 
supplying SPP with 6.5 bcma of gas over a 20-year period. / e gas crisis of Janu-
ary 2009 followed, shortly a; er signing the contract, which & nally provided the 
impetus to begin diversi& cation for supply. A; er the January 2009 gas crisis, 
SPP signed (diversi& cation) contracts with E.ON Ruhrgas for ten years and 
GDF Suez for & ve years.99 / ese agreements can ensure up to 20 per cent of Slo-
vakia’s annual gas consumption. In case of disruption of supplies from the east, 
the contracted volumes arrive by reversed J ow through a system of pipelines100 
Hungary (more precisely Mol) contracted in the 1990s with E.ON Ruhrgas and 
GDF Suez, the owners of SPP, with a 49 per cent share.
Gas can enter the Czech Republic not only from Slovakia but also from Ger-
many through four cross-border entry points. / e Czech Republic, having only 
marginal domestic gas production, attempted to undermine the dominant posi-
tion of Russian gas supplies in 1997, when the then state-owned Transgas of the 
Czech Republic signed a 20-year gas supply contract with Norwegian compa-
nies. / e contract envisaged annual supplies gradually, increasing to 3 bcm by 
2002.101 Transgas had previously signed a long-term gas supply contract with 
97 Gas Connect Austria GmbH, http://www.gasconnect.at/de/Unser-Netz/Leitungssystem/KIP; ICIS 
Heren, January 28, 2009, http://www.icis.com/heren/articles/2009/01/28/9309362/russiaukraine-crisis-
wake-up-call-for-europe.html; Správa o zabezpe ení dodávok energií a rieaenie prípadných núdzových sta-
vov s urením prísluanej zodpovednosti za ich rieaenie, lrv.rokovania.sk/data/att/122258_subor.doc.
98 Slovak Republic: Energy Policy Review 2005, 138.
99 In addition to these, SPP signed a short-term contract with Germany’s VNG for 30 mmcm of gas in case of 
an emergency.
100 Oil and Gas Emergency Policy – Slovak Republic 2011 Update (Paris: IEA, 2011).
101 Europolitics, April 23, 1997, http://www.europolitics.info/czechs-and-norway-sign-natural-gas-supply-
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Gazexport102 in 1998 for 15 years, and extended the contract in 2006 so as to 
receive 9 bcma of gas to 2035. Until 2005, RWE Transgas was the sole import-
er of gas to the Czech Republic, but in 2006, new gas importers Vemex103 and 
Wingas (a joint venture of Wintershall and Gazprom) began operations in the 
Czech market. / e importers, supplied by Gazprom Export, developed a negli-
gible market share, approximately 0.5 per cent. In 2007, Vemex, the only other 
importer of gas apart from RWE Transgas, allowed Gazprom to diversify its 
exports to the Czech Republic and reached & nal consumers, thereby circum-
venting RWE Transgas. A March 2006 short-term supply contract between 
Vemex and Gazprom Export preceded a long(er)-term agreement in October 
2007.104 / e contract for 2008 to 2012 accounted for the delivery of only 0.5 
bcma of gas, with a possible extension for & ve more years. In 2010, the number 
of importers increased to 19 (from 12 in 2009, and 5 in 2008). / e most impor-
tant additions were RWE Transgas and Vemex, but the market share of RWE 
Transgas has quickly declined in the Czech Republic.105 / e di1 erence between 
the long-term contract prices and market prices has a1 ected the company as a 
result of many new traders purchasing gas at advantageous prices in Western Eu-
ropean markets for the Czech Republic. In 2009, the share of Russian imports 
fell dramatically to 58.8 per cent from 73.6 per cent in 2008. In 2010, Russia 
accounted for 64.1 per cent of gas imports, Norwegian gas for 12.4 per cent, and 
gas from EU member states for 23.5 per cent. In 2009, gas supplied by German 
companies represented 6.6 per cent of total imports, compared to 2.5 per cent 
in 2008. In 2007, only 2 mmcm of gas came from Germany for Vemex from a 
VNG storage facility. / e share of supplies from the EU and Russia increased 
at the expense of those from Norway.106 Concerning the interconnections with 
neighbouring countries, no interconnection exists between Austria and the 
Czech Republic,107 but three pipelines are currently being planned.
deal-artr196930-10.html; The Role of Natural Gas in Europe, EU Enlargement Watch, October 2000, 
http://www.eu-energy.com/EUEW-Gas.pdf.
102 / is was the old name of Gazprom Export.
103 At that time, ZMB GmbH and Centrex Europe Energy & Gas AG each held 33 per cent in Vemex. In 2009, 
Gazprom Germania integrated its trading subsidiary ZMB. Now, Gazprom Germania has a 50.14 per cent 
stake in Vemex. (ICIS Heren, August 27, 2009, http://www.icis.com/heren/articles/2009/08/27/9313589/
gazprom-germania-integrates-trading-subsidiary-zmb.html.)
104 redOrbit, October 12, 2007, http://www.redorbit.com/news/business/1100068/gazprom_and_vemex_
reportedly_sign_gas_deal/.
105 Annual Report 2011, RWE Transgas, 2012.
106 Information is provided by the annual reports of the Energy Regulatory O]  ce of the Czech Republic. See 
http://www.energy-regulators.eu/portal/page/portal/EER_HOME/EER_PUBLICATIONS; http://
eru.cz/dias-browse_articles.php?parentId=271!
107 Border crossing between Hevlín (the Czech Republic) and Laa an der / aya (Austria) is a di1 erent thing. It 
is a connection to Austria’s distribution network.
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Hungary purchases gas through cross-border pipelines with Ukraine and Aus-
tria. Due to high Russian contract prices, imported quantities through the 
Ukrainian–Hungarian border (at Beregovo point for domestic use) have fallen 
dramatically since 2008, while the role of the HAG pipeline between Austria 
and Hungary has become very signi& cant. Due to increased interest, the capac-
ity of HAG has expanded from, in part, necessity driven by the new strategic gas 
storage facility in Hungary. / e Hungarian–Romanian interconnection, inau-
gurated in 2010, preceded the Hungarian–Croatian pipeline of 2011.108 Apart 
from the missing Hungarian–Slovakian interconnection, Slovenia proposed a 
small-capacity pipeline from Hungary and Slovenia, but interest did not extend 
beyond a completed feasibility study. 
/ e main gas supplier to Hungary is Gazprom Export through the intermediary 
Panrusgáz. E.ON Földgáz Trade’s long-term gas supply contract with Gazprom 
Export expires in 2015.109 / is contract, concluded by Mol, was subsequently 
assumed by E.ON Ruhrgas, who acquired, among others, Mol’s gas wholesale, 
marketing, and trading subsidiary Mol Földgázellátó (Mol Natural Gas Sup-
ply Co.) in the mid-2000s. As mentioned, in the second half of the 1990s, Mol 
signed supply contracts with Ruhrgas (until 2015) and Gaz de France (until 
2012). In 1998, long-term gas supply contracts involved O&G Minerals, Ltd. 
and the Hungarian-based Euro-bridge K; . (a subsidiary of Gaz de France) for 
delivery of gas from Ukrainian sources. But, in early January 2005, Mol ab-
rogated the Euro-bridge K; . 2 due to breaches of contracts. / e Swiss-based 
Bothli Trade AG replaced Euro-bridge K; . by a 2004 contract with Mol for gas 
Bothli marketed for Eural Trans Gas.110 Since Eural was an o1 shore company, 
registered in Hungary, its activities had restrictions, but with the appearance of 
the Hungarian-based company Emfesz, Bothli-Trade assigned its two gas sup-
ply contracts with Mol to Emfesz.111 Rosukrenergo replaced Eural and a; er the 
January 2009 gas crisis and the elimination of Rosukrenergo from the system 
ended Emfesz’s presence in the market.
Serbia receives gas from and through Hungary and provides transit services to 
Bosnia-Herzegovina. Serbia has no other cross-border entries or exits. / e share 
108 According to CEO FGSZ János Zsuga, physical reverse J ow is possible on all cross-border interconnections 
with the EU Member States.
109 / is study does not discuss the future role of MVM and the planned takeover of E.ON’s gas business in 
Hungary. 
110 FigyelöNet, April 8, 2004, http://fn.hir24.hu/itthon/2004/04/08/gazmosas_svajcon_at_kapna/?action= 
PrintPage; Mol Annual Report 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004; Mol’s Base Prospectus 
dated 31 August 2004.
111 Case No COMP/M.3696 E.ON/MOL. http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/
m3696_20051221_20600_en.pdf.
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of domestic gas consumption has increased, accounting for 19 per cent in Serbia 
in 2011. With the exception of a small amount of gas, imported from Hungary, 
Russia is the dominant gas supplier to Serbia112 based on its long-term contract 
with Gazprom; however, the contract adds annexes every year, making the prac-
tice of extending the Russian–Serbian contract an annual event.113 According 
to earlier statements, the take or pay principle does not remain applicable to 
Serbia. In mid-October 2012, intergovernmental agencies signed an agreement 
between Serbia and Russia for gas supplies through 2021, which is necessary for 
the new long-term (commercial). / e agreement envisions gas supplies of up to 
5 bcma, more than double the current level of imports, and is only for domestic 
use. According to media information, Gazprom and Srbijagas will complete ac-
cords that regulate the price and delivery volumes every year throughout the 
life of the new agreement.114 In mid-December 2011, Srbijagas’ general man-
ager, speaking about discounted prices, revealed that Serbia would be required 
to draw 85 per cent of the agreed quantity but would not have to pay penalties 
for not accepting the remainder, and a possibility exists for Serbia to renegotiate 
commercial terms each year.115
Regarding the issue of gas interconnection projects in Serbia, the schedule for 
the planned bi-directional Serbian–Bulgarian interconnector targets the end of 
2015 for operations, and the construction is expected to begin in 2013. / e 
project is part of the Energy Community Gas Ring, which is a concept for link-
ing the networks in Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, Macedo-
nia, Montenegro, and Serbia to develop a regional gas market. / e Ionian Adri-
atic Pipeline (IAP), planned to follow the Adriatic coast from Albania through 
Montenegro and Bosnia-Herzegovina to Croatia, would be part of the Gas Ring. 
/ e bi-directional IAP could connect Croatia with the planned Trans Adriatic 
Pipeline (TAP: Greece–Albania–Italy; see below) in Albania. Apart from the 
112 Concerning purchases from Hungary, all the information we have is that in October 2009, Srbijagas and 
E.ON Földgáz Trade signed a gas sale contract for 200 mmcm of gas in the winter of 2009/2010. (E.ON 
Földgáz Trade – News, October 29, 2009, http://www.eon-foldgaz-trade.com/en/media/press/news/e-
on-seals-gas-supply-agreement-with-srbijagas.)
113 Energy Agency Activities: Energy Market in Serbia 2005-2010, Energy Agency of the Republic of Ser-
bia (AERS), 2011, http://www.aers.rs/Files/Izvestaji/Ostali/Eng/AERS%20Report%202005_2010_eng.
pdf; Energy Agency Annual Report for 2011 (Report on the Energy Sector of Serbia. Energy Agency An-
nual Report and Financial Report), AERS, Belgrade, May 2012, http://www.aers.rs/Files/Izvestaji/Ostali/
Eng/AERS%20Annual%20Report%202011.pdf; Gazprom Export Gas market news, December 30, 2010, 
http://www.gazpromexport.com/en/presscenter/news/98/.
114 RIA Novosti, October 13, 2012, http://en.rian.ru/world/20121013/176601838.html; Itar-Tass, Octo-
ber 13, 2012, http://pda.itar-tass.com/c1/544850.html; Interfax, October 15, 2012, http://interfax.az/
view/555093; Gazprom Export – Gas market news, October 13, 2012, http://www.gazpromexport.com/
en/presscenter/news/701/.
115 Reuters, December 21, 2011, http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/12/21/serbia-gazprom-gas-idUSL6E 
7NL4H320111221.
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Bulgarian-Serbian interconnection, Croatia–Serbia, Serbia–Macedonia, Mac-
edonia–Albania, and Croatia–Bosnia-Herzegovina are suggested projects.
Bosnia-Herzegovina can only receive imported gas import through the border 
with Serbia, and is entirely dependent on gas purchases from Russia. Energo-
invest d.d. Sarajevo and Gazprom extend the gas supply contract annually. At 
the end of 2011, at the extension of the contract for 2012, the news reported 
negotiations for a long-term gas supply contract are continuing.116 In Bosnia-
Herzegovina, due to poor conditions in the industry, gas consumption is lower 
than in 1990. Although the current gas consumption is well below pre-war 
levels, this rate is expected to signi& cantly increase by 2020.117 As to the gas 
transmission pipeline development projects, apart from the leg from the Ionian 
Adriatic gas pipeline, future examinations will most likely include the possibil-
ity of other interconnections between Croatia and Bosnia examined,118 with the 
intent of building three more interconnections between Bosnia-Herzegovina 
and Croatia. However, despite these plans, implementation remains still only a 
distant projection.119
Croatia has substantial gas production compared to its consumption. Its gas 
supply contract with Gazprom Export expired at the end of 2010. Until the 
end of 2010, Croatia had imported around 1 bcma of gas from Gazprom Ex-
port and received a negligible volume of gas, only a few million cubic meters a 
year, from other suppliers.120 At the end of 2010, Prirodni Plin, a subsidiary of 
Croatia’s INA, contracted with ENI for only 750 mmcm of gas per year for three 
years. / is agreement, in June 2011, preceded another unpublished agreement, 
not specifying a volume, between Croatia’s Prvo Plinarsko Društvo and E.ON 
116 24sata.info, December 1, 2011, http://www.24sata.info/vijesti/bosna-i-hercegovina/79468-Moskva-Ener-
goinvest-Gazprom-dogovorili-produzenje-isporuke-gasa-BiH.html.
117 A. So; ić and L. Glamočić, National Background Report on Energy for Bosnia and Herzegovina, Prepared 
in the frame of the WBC-INCO.NET project, Sarajevo, 2012, http://wbc-inco.net/attach/0_National_
Background_Report_Energy_BiH_2012.pdf.
118 Western Balkans Investment Framework, http://www.wbif-ipf.eu/index.php?page_id=377&id=88, 
http://www.wbif-ipf.eu/index.php?page_id=377&id=89; V. Đurović, “Interconnections and Transit,” En-
ergy Charter – Stakeholder Event on Gas Transit and Cross-border Cooperation, Brussels, June 19, 2012, 
http://www.encharter.org/& leadmin/user_upload/Conferences/2012_June/Durovic.pdf; G. Frančić, 
“Plinacro Ltd: Security of Supply by TSO,” Enlargement and Integration Workshop, “Assessing Infrastruc-
ture in the Electricity and Gas Sector,” Dubrovnik, Croatia, October 5-7, 2011, http://ses.jrc.ec.europa.
eu/sites/ses/& les/documents/events/2011_10_ei_ws_croatia/francic_plinacro.pdf; BH-Gas http://www.
energy-community.org/pls/portal/docs/708184.PDF.
119 Business.hr, July 12, 2012, http://www.business.hr/ulaganja/antunovic-rok-za-lng-na-krku-kraj-2016-god-
ine/print.
120 For example, in 2009, on paper, imports from Italy, Slovenia, Germany, France, and Switzerland were mini-
mal (Annual Report 2009, Croatian Energy Regulatory Agency [HERA], 2010, http://www.hera.hr/eng-
lish/documents/pdf/HERA_Annual_Report_2009.pdf ).
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Ruhrgas.121 / is second arrangement is signi& cant in terms of diversi& cation by 
arranging for gas supplies through the Hungarian–Croatian interconnection 
to begin in 2011 and terminating the exclusive, long-standing avenue for im-
portation to Croatia. But since a leg will connect Croatia to the South Stream 
project (see below), clearly in the future Croatia will again be a Russian custom-
er. As to the progress of other projects, according to end-2011 information, the 
Croatian–Italian interconnector is operating as an upstream pipeline.122 Apart 
from the Croatian–Serbian and Croatian–Bosnian interconnections, plans also 
include interconnections between Croatia and Slovenia. Moreover, if the origi-
nal plans had moved forward, Croatia’s LNG regasi& cation facility would have 
be operating, but in Croatia, the Adria LNG project of an international consor-
tium, planned on the island of Krk, has stalled. Meanwhile, Croatia is not idle; 
the Croatian state-owned TSO Plinacro is examining a three-phase alternative 
project, the so-called “migration concept,” starting with an LNG Regasi& cation 
Vessel (LNG RV) and reaching the third phase with an onshore LNG terminal. 
However, according to the feasibility study, as the terminal is due for release by 
September 2013, with investment decisions made by the end of the same year, 
skipping some phases is possible.123
Slovenia, with a volume of barely more than 1 bcma, is almost entirely depend-
ent on external supplies of gas. Slovenia receives gas from both Italy and Austria. 
Since 2003, the share of Russian imports declined steadily from 59 per cent in 
2003 to only 47 per cent in 2010. In 2011, 48 per cent was Russian, 23 per cent 
Algerian, 22 per cent Austrian, 7 per cent Italian, and the remainder from other 
countries. Geoplin d.o.o. Ljubljana is the largest importer of gas, with a 92.8 per 
cent share of the Slovenian market in 2011. / e same year, Adriaplin, belonging 
to ENI, and Petrol were the other two importers.124 In 2009 and 2010, the role 
of short-term contracts for gas imports saw dramatic increases, followed by a 
slight decrease in 2011. Geoplin’s long-term gas supply contract with Gazprom 
is e1 ective through 2017. In 2009, the Slovenian side proposed revising the 
121 In July 2012, Croatia’s largest fertilizer producer, Petrokemija d.d. signed a gas supply contract with E.ON 
Ruhrgas only for the August-September 2012 period.
122 Dr. Zsuga Jones, “MET Energiamuhley, 2011.10.14 Budapest,” http://www.e-met.hu/& les/cikk2661_Dr_
Zsuga_Janos_Energia_Muhely_2011-10-04.pdf.
123 Presentation given by Dubravko Proštenik (Plinacro) in Budapest on May 31, 2012; Ministarstvo re-
gionalnoga razvoja i fondova Europske unije; ICIS Heren, July 4, 2012, http://www.icis.com/heren/arti-
cles/2012/07/04/9575385/& rst-phase-of-croatian-lng-terminal-ready-for-2016.html; Plinacro – Novosti, 
http://www.plinacro.hr/default.aspx?id=371; Western Balkan Investment Framework, http://www.mr-
rfeu.hr/UserDocsImages/EU%20fondovi/b03%20WB5-HR-ENE-01-LNG_Regasi& cation_Vessel%20
20%2002%202012.pdf.
124 Information is derived from the annual reports of Slovenia’s Energy Agency (as an energy regulator). See 
http://www.agen-rs.si/en/informacija.asp?id_meta_type=36&id_informacija=708, http://www.energy-
regulators.eu/portal/page/portal/EER_HOME/EER_PUBLICATIONS!
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contract and extending it through 2035. In August 2009, Gazprom Export and 
Geoplin signed a letter of intent to extend the contract and review the possibil-
ity of increasing the amount of gas within the framework of the South Stream 
project.125 In March 2011, the CEO of Gazprom commented on negotiations to 
extend the contract through 2035 and increase exports from 0.5 to 1.7 bcma.126 
Currently no contract is in force.
With the commissioning of the Hungarian–Romanian interconnection, Roma-
nia receives gas through three entry points. Previously, only two cross-border 
entry points with Ukraine were available. However, Romania’s energy strategy 
for 2007–2020 and 2011–2020 plans a third Ukrainian–Romanian gas pipe-
line; the second plan updates the 2011 version. Romania attempted diversi& ca-
tion in the 1990s but without success.127 / e activity of the intermediary Rosu-
krenergo allowed some diversi& cation, but the & rst real success, albeit small, was 
the interconnection between Hungary and Romania, which began operations 
in 2010. Two intermediaries, the Swiss-based WIEE and Romania’s Conef En-
ergy S.R.L., manage Gazprom’s gas sales to Romania, and the situation will not 
change in the near future, since Gazprom signed long-term contracts in 2007 
with the two companies, e1 ective through 2030. WIEE will supply 5 bcma of 
gas to Romania from 2013, while, according to the contract, Conef has been 
supplied by 2 bcma since 2010.
/ e Romanian–Bulgarian interconnection is under construction, and an addi-
tional planned interconnection between Romania and Moldova may also enter 
service by 2013. In principle, Romania could construct an LNG regasi& cation 
facility within the framework of the AGRI LNG project (see below), but a fea-
sibility study is incomplete.
Despite its favourable geographic location, Bulgaria buys gas only from Rus-
sia and, at present, has only one supply route through Romania.128 Bulgaria’s 
125 RIA Novosti, February 16, 2011, http://www.ria.ru/economy/20110216/334797983.html.
126 RIA Novosti, March 22, 2011, http://ria.ru/economy/20110322/356819989.html.
127 Stern, 117.
128 During the January 2009 gas crisis, at the last minute, reverse J ow from Greece to Bulgaria (and, as men-
tioned, from the Czech Rebublic to Slovakia) became operational. / e CEO of Bulgargaz said in October 
2009 that Bulgaria had concluded a framework agreement with Greece to receive about 3 mmcm of gas per 
day in case of emergency, adding that an agreement in principle also existed with Turkey’s BOTAŞ for about 
2 mmcm per day. According to Bulgaria’s Energy Ministry, Bulgaria can receive more than 2.4 mmcm of 
(reverse J ow) gas per day through the two cross-border pipelines in an emergency (dnes.dir.bg, October 8, 
2009, http://dnes.dir.bg/news.php?id=5189791&tag_id=63160; Byuletin za sastoyanieto i razvitieto na 
energetikata na Republika Balgariya, 2012, http://www.mi.government.bg/& les/useruploads/& les/epsp/
buletin_energy_2012&annex.pdf; Annual Activity Report, Independent Auditor’s Report, Financial State-
ments, Bulgargaz EAD, December 31, 2009, http://www.bulgargaz.bg/UserFiles/File/Annual%20Finan-
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long-term gas supply contracts are due to expire at the end of 2012. / e new 
contract should solve four problems. First, gas should be cheaper than cur-
rently (introducing a spot component into the formula, similar to oil prod-
ucts). Second, the new contract should eliminate intermediaries, such as WIEE 
and Overgaz. / ird, the term of the contract should be shorter. Finally, allow-
ance for re-export should be possible. Bulgaria seeks to avoid the constraints 
of a long-term commitment, but prefers to pursue opportunities to diversify, 
with domestic (mainly Black Sea) gas production, or gas through planned in-
terconnectors.129 However, apart from the Romanian–Bulgarian pipeline, no 
international projects exist with & nal investment decisions. According to the 
dra;  ten-year natural gas transmission and storage infrastructure development 
plan 2013–2022 for Bulgarian TSO Bulgartransgaz, which was formulated in 
September 2012, the Interconnection Bulgaria–Romania (IBR) has a planned 
completion and commissioning in 2013, the Interconnection Turkey–Bulgaria 
(ITB, from Malkoclar to Lozenets) in 2014, the Interconnection Greece–Bul-
garia in 2014-2015, the Interconnection Bulgaria–Serbia (IBS) in 2015, and the 
CNG (compressed natural gas) facility in 2015-2016.130
Before the gas crisis of January 2009, Bulgaria had begun initial steps to purchase 
Azerbaijani gas. / e protocol of intention in June 2008 envisaged the possibility 
of a contract for 1 bcma of gas to Bulgaria through Azerbaijan.131 In November 
2009, a new possibility appeared, the CNG option, in addition to the pipeline 
gas132; however, Azerbaijan would choose the land route through Turkey over 
the CNG option.133 
cial%20Report%2031.12.2009.PDF; The January 2009 Gas Supply Disruption to the EU: An Assessment).
129 Following completion of this study, the new contract was signed in November 2012.
130 Ten-Year Natural Gas Transmission and Storage Infrastructure Development Plan 2013-2022 (Draft 
for public consultation), Bulgartransgaz, September 2012, http://www.bulgartransgaz.bg/UserFiles/File/
News/Bulgartransgaz%20TYNDP%202013-2022_ENG.pdf.
131 Novinite.com, June 4, 2008, http://www.novinite.com/view_news.php?id=93815.
132 APA, November 13, 2009, http://en.apa.az/news/111019; T. Tsakiris, Can the AGRI Project Revolution-
ize Regional Gas Geopolitics? EKEM European Energy Policy Observatory, October 9, 2010, http://www.
ekemeuroenergy.org/en/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=100:can-the-agri-project-
revolutionize-regional-gas-geopolitics&catid=45:caspian-sea-black-sea-and-south-east-europe&Item-
id=69; News.Az, November 16, 2009, http://www.news.az/articles/2510/print.
133 Economy News.bg, August 18, 2010; News.Az, August 18, 2010, http://www.news.az/articles/21211; No-
vinite.com, October 4, 2010, http://www.novinite.com/view_news.php?id=120787; Novinite.com, June 
23, 2011, http://www.novinite.com/view_news.php?id=129578; Upstreamonline.com, August 17, 2010, 
http://http//www.upstreamonline.com/live/article226287.ece; Trend, August 17, 2010, http://en.trend.
az/capital/energy/1736279.html; Reuters, April 27, 2012, http://uk.reuters.com/article/2012/04/27/
bulgaria-azerbaijan-gas-idUKL6E8FR3YX20120427; The Sofi a Echo, September 25, 2011, http://so& -
aecho.com/2011/09/25/1162402_azerbaijan-may-start-gas-deliveries-to-bulgaria-in-2013; Natural Gas 
Europe, November 15, 2011, http://www.naturalgaseurope.com/bulgaria-and-azerbaijan-& nalise-gas-
deal-3499; The Sofi a Echo, April 3, 2012, http://so& aecho.com/2012/04/03/1800619_borissov-to-push-
azerbaijan-georgia-bulgaria-gas-transit-project-at-meeting-with-van-rompuy.
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Despite establishing several deadlines for the start of deliveries, none are close to 
realization, meetings and agreements notwithstanding. 
Bulgaria prefers & nancing the Turkish–Bulgarian interconnection (the & rst sec-
tion of the Nabucco West [see below]) through the grant from the EU’s Euro-
pean Energy Programme for Recovery (EEPR), or by some other entity. How-
ever, this proposal is not possible, since in October 2012, the Bulgarian Prime 
Minister indicated that if the plan is unacceptable, the pipeline’s construction 
(about BGN 100 million [EUR 50 million] from Bulgartransgaz) will be only 
for emergencies before 2018.134 Meanwhile, other information became appar-
ent when, in September 2012, the former head of Bulgaria’s state-run gas sup-
plier, Bulgargaz, announced that the Bulgarian government had secretly agreed 
to protocols of intent with the Turkish company, Setgaz, to build an intercon-
nector between the gas networks of the two countries. According to the an-
nouncement, the gas pipeline is to reach Stara Zagora in Bulgaria’s south, and 
the expected completion is the end of 2014. Bulgartransgaz con& rmed the news, 
adding that Setgaz’s project has a di1 erent concept and route from the planned 
interconnection between Malkoclar and Lozenets.135
 
On the issue of LNG, Bulgaria is not considering a Black Sea project; rather, 
Bulgaria favours a CNG project, appropriate for gas from Azerbaijan.136 / e 
history of Bulgaria’s CNG plan only began in 2009. / e fact that Azerbaijan 
prefers to use Turkey as an export route rather than the Black Sea is not the 
only problem with the Black Sea CNG project. Additionally, the CNG project 
clashes with the AGRI LNG.137
134 Darik News, September 29, 2012, http://dariknews.bg/view_article.php?article_id=970653; News.bg, 
October 8, 2012, http://news.ibox.bg/news/id_2031338516; New Europe Online, October 9, 2012, 
http://www.neurope.eu/article/borisov-lays-down-conditions-nabucco; Bulgarian National Radio, Oc-
tober 10, 2012, http://bnr.bg/sites/en/Economy/Pages/1010NABUCCOprojectbefore2018.aspx; News.
Az, October 5, 2010, http://news.az/articles/economy/23965.
135 Novinite.bg, September 12, 2012, http://novinite.bg/articles/19561/Turska-& rma-shtyala-da-stroi-
gazova-vrazka-s-Balgariya; Novinite.bg, September 12, 2012, http://novinite.bg/articles/19574/Bulgar-
transgaz-i-Setgaz-shteli-da-stroyat-2-razlichni-gazoprovoda-s-Turciya; Novinite.com, September 12, 2012, 
http://www.novinite.com/view_news.php?id=143172; Novinite.com, September 12, 2012, http://www.
novinite.com/view_news.php?id=143179.
136 The Sofi a Echo, September 22, 2011, http://so& aecho.com/2011/09/22/1161389_bulgaria-may-help-
georgia-in-joining-european-energy-network; Novinite.com, April 3, 2012, http://www.novinite.com/
view_news.php?id=138176.
137 / e Bulgarian media reported in April 2012 that Bulgaria’s Prime Minister discussed transportation of LNG 
in Georgia. At that time, as a former Energy Minister, Traicho Traikov explained that the issue involved 
CNG rather than LNG. However, buying CNG would be much more expensive than pipeline gas imports 
from Russia. (Money.bg, April 3, 2012, http://money.bg/news/id_1670814083; Investor.bg, April 3, 2012, 
http://www.investor.bg/ikonomika-i-politika/332/a/traikov-vnosyt-na-kompresiran-gaz-ot-azerbaidjan-
shte-struva-skypo,132524/.)
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Macedonia buys gas only from Russia and through Bulgaria, having no other 
import capacity available. In 2012, Macedonia’s Makpetrol A.D. signed a long-
term, 15-year gas supply contract with Gazprom Export.138 / e gas market in 
Macedonia is underdeveloped and only supplies a small part of northern Mac-
edonia. No gas distribution network exists in the country at all, with most natu-
ral gas consumed by industries and by district companies for heat.139
6.  Diversi> cation projects in the Southern Corridor
/ e Southern Corridor initiative includes routes traversing Turkey, as well as 
routes that could cross through the Black Sea, in order to realize the pipeline, 
CNG, and LNG options. / e Trans-Caspian Pipeline would also be a major 
project in the Southern Corridor to bring new sources of gas to Europe.140
Apart from the delays, the common characteristic among all Southern Corridor 
projects (except for the Trans-Caspian Pipeline) is the bid for Azeri gas, namely 
gas from the second stage of the Shah Deniz & eld development (Shah Deniz 2). 
Azeri gas seems to be the only guaranteed source for Europe. / e expectation is 
that exports from Azerbaijan would begin about the end of 2017. 
So far, Greece is the only EU member state to have received Azeri gas. Turkey 
re-exports a small amount of Azeri gas to Greece in the & rst stage of gas produc-
tion from the Shah Deniz & eld. / e imported gas travels through the Intercon-
nection Turkey–Greece, or ITG, and represents an important step, signalled by 
Washington’s support, when U.S. Energy Secretary attended the inauguration 
ceremony in 2007.141
138 Gazprom Export – Gas market news, September 27, 2012, http://www.gazpromexport.ru/en/presscenter/
news/682/
139 Ten-Year Natural Gas Transmission and Storage Infrastructure Development Plan 2013-2022.
140 South Stream is not part of the Southern Corridor initiative. See European Parliament – Parliamentary 
questions, OJ C 265 E, 09/09/2011, January 7, 2011, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getAllAn-
swers.do?reference=E-2010-9633&language=EN; European Parliament – Parliamentary questions, OJ C 
138 E, 07/05/2011, April 23, 2010, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getAllAnswers.do?reference=E-
2010-0970&language=DA; European Parliament – Parliamentary questions, OJ C 249 E, 26/08/2011, 
November 26, 2010, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getAllAnswers.do?reference=E-2010-8539& 
language=LT; European Commission – Press Release, IP/11/1023, September 12, 2011, http://europa.
eu/rapid/press-release_IP-11-1023_en.htm?locale=en; “Nabucco gas pipe’s prospects slim a; er RWE 
move,” Reuters, January 19, 2012, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/01/19/energy-gas-pipelines-idU-
SL6E8CJ2XL20120119.
141 “Greece and Turkey Open Gas Pipeline”, The New York Times, November 19, 2007, http://www.nytimes.
com/2007/11/19/world/europe/19greece.html?_r=1.
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Until fall 2011, the three competing projects in the Southern Corridor, the 
Nabucco, ITGI, and TAP, considered a merger or another form of cooperation 
among the projects. While cooperation was visible and engendered discussion 
several times, mostly in 2011, the principals’ perspectives di1 ered, and conse-
quently achieved no positive result.
Meanwhile, important changes have occurred in the Southern Corridor since 
the dissolution of this cooperation, but the outcome remains elusive. / e & rst 
crucial change, in September 2011, arose from BP’s concept for the so-called 
South East Europe Pipeline (SEEP), which would originate in western Turkey 
and cross Bulgaria and Romania to Hungary’s eastern frontier, and would be 
about a third of Nabucco’s length.142 / e announcement caused surprise; how-
ever, a BP executive, in March 2011, declared that the company would construct 
a 10 bcm line into Europe that had the capability of expansion. “We’ve got to 
stop being preoccupied by the word Nabucco,” he added.143 Shortly a; er the 
announcement, the Shah Deniz consortium received bids from the Nabucco, 
TAP, and ITGI consortium by the 1 October 2011 deadline, and SEEP became 
a fourth possible option. Not much later, on 25 October 2011, & nalization of 
the so-called Izmir agreements included provisions to sell gas to Turkey from 
the Shah Deniz 2 and to transit gas from Shah Deniz 2 via the networks of the 
Turkish Botaş company.144
/ e second crucial change started to be outlined in the Southern Corridor oc-
curred 2 November 2011, when the deputy head of the State Oil Company of 
the Azerbaijani Republic, or SOCAR announced that a consortium would be 
created to build a new pipeline that would carry natural gas from the Shah Den-
iz 2 project through Turkey.145 On 17 November 2011, SOCAR announced 
that Azerbaijan and Turkey had begun a Trans-Anatolian gas pipeline (TAN-
AP) project from Turkey’s eastern border to its western border146 with a capacity 
of no less than 16 bcma and assigned 10 bcm for Europe and 6 bcm for Turkey’s 
western regions.147 Although SOCAR denied the new project would negatively 
142 “BP plans gas pipeline to Europe from Azerbaijan”, Financial Times, September 26, 2011, http://www.
; .com/intl/cms/s/0/ed9151b8-e84c-11e0-ab03-00144feab49a.html.
143 Natural Gas Europe, March 26, 2011, http://www.naturalgaseurope.com/caspianeu-gas-pipeline-10-bcm.
144 News.Az, October 28, 2011, http://www.news.az/articles/47744/print; News.Az, October 28, 2011, 
http://news.az/articles/economy/47699; Eurasia Daily Monitor, Vol. 8, Issue 201, November 1, 2011, 
http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=38603&tx_ttnews% 
5BbackPid%5D=512.
145 PanARMENIAN.Net, November 2, 2011, http://www.panarmenian.net/eng/news/82691/.
146 Reuters, November 17, 2011, http://af.reuters.com/article/commoditiesNews/idAFL5E7MH1W52011 
1117?sp=true.
147 PanARMENIAN.Net, November 2, 2011, http://www.panarmenian.net/eng/news/82691/.
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a1 ect the Nabucco project,148 the situation clearly indicated termination of the 
last remaining chance for the full-scale version of Nabucco, or Nabucco classic, 
including a pipeline in Turkey.
On 26 December 2011, a signed memorandum of understanding concerned 
the construction of the TANAP pipeline. / e agreement identi& ed SOCAR, 
Botaş, and TPAO (of Turkey) as the & rst members of the pipeline consortium 
and concluded that third-party international oil and natural gas companies 
could participate in the consortium later during the construction process.149 
Delays postponed the intergovernmental agreement (and the host government 
agreement) between Turkey and Azerbaijan until late June 2012. / e agreement 
was di]  cult, but, ultimately, the shareholdings remained as initially agreed at 
80, 10, and 10 per cent, respectively. Consequently the Turkish share did not 
increase;150 SOCAR retained 51 per cent, with the remaining 29 per cent dis-
tributed among potential partners, such as members of the Shah Deniz con-
sortium, including BP, Statoil, and Total.151 According to the plans, TANAP’s 
capacity could reach 16 bcma by 2020, 23 bcma by 2023, and 31 bcma by 2026. 
/ e Shah Deniz consortium conducted a three-round selection process for 
pipelines originating at the western border of Turkey. In the & rst round, in Feb-
ruary 2012, the group chose the Trans Adriatic Pipeline over ITGI as a possi-
ble route, as long as the south of Italy would be the pipeline’s destination. / e 
second round, in June 2012, selected the Nabucco West project, a scaled-down 
version of the Nabucco classic, and rejected the South East Europe Pipeline as 
the option for Central and South East Europe. / e & nal decision from the Shah 
Deniz consortium in mid-2013 will choose either the Nabucco West or the 
Trans Adriatic Pipeline.
/ e public became aware of Nabucco West in February 2012. Compared with 
the original Nabucco project, Nabuco West is not only shorter but smaller in 
terms of capacity. / e design of Nabucco West incorporates an initial capacity 
148 Reuters, November 17, 2011, http://af.reuters.com/article/commoditiesNews/idAFL5E7MH1W52011 
1117?sp=true.
149 SOCAR – News, December 26, 2011, http://new.socar.az/socar/en/news-and-media/news-archives/
news-archives/id/4086.
150 Bloomberg, March 29, 2012, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-03-29/turkey-seeks-to-raise-
stake-in-tanap-gas-pipeline-reuters-says.html; EurasiaNet.org, April 6, 2012, http://www.eurasianet.org/
node/65233; Bloomberg, May 1, 2012, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-05-01/azerbaijan-turkey-
to-sign-delayed-tanap-pipe-deal-end-of-june.html.
151 Bloomberg, September 6, 2012, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-09-06/socar-o1 ers-29-of-gas-
pipeline-to-bp-statoil-total-partners.html; AzerNews, September 6, 2012, http://www.azernews.az/oil_
and_gas/43415.html.
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of 10 bcma and has the ability to increase its scale up to 23 bcma. Initially, TAP’s 
plan would surpass 10 bcma and allow an increase of up to 20 bcma. 
Nabucco West’s announcement was met with several negative messages from 
several actors at di1 erent levels. Not only Mol but also the Hungarian govern-
ment, RWE, Bulgaria, the EU, and the United States expressed concerns about 
this project. Under such conditions, before the submission of a proposal for 
Nabucco West to the Shah Deniz consortium, on 23 April 2012, the Hungar-
ian Prime Minister indicated that Mol was withdrawing from the project, be-
cause Mol, or precisely FGSZ, did not approve the 2012 budget for Nabucco 
Gas Pipeline International GmbH (Nabucco International Company). Having 
failed to pay its contribution, Mol’s share in the pipeline company decreased. 
Not surprisingly, Russia immediately welcomed the move.
/ e history of Nabucco a ten-year saga that encountered serious problems since 
its inception. In early May 2011, the consortium once again decided to post-
pone start-up, and Nabucco Gas Pipeline International GmbH announced that 
its initial J ow of gas will begin in 2017, rather than in 2015.152 But the target 
date of 2015 was also the result of multi-year delays. For example, in 2004 the 
target was 2009, and in 2005 the start-up target was 2011.153
In early March 2010, European Energy Commissioner Günther Oettinger did 
not exclude the possibility that the Nabucco consortium could decide in 2010 
to cease supporting the project altogether.154 In late March 2010, Oettinger 
believed the complet ion of the Nabucco gas pipeline might be delayed until 
2018.155 In Hungary, enrgy being a highly politicized issue, & nally, in July 2011, 
Mol Chairman-CEO Zsolt Hernádi admitted the existence of serious problems 
with Nabucco and stated that Mol would increase contributions upon ensured 
returns.156 In October 2011, Hungary’s then Minister for National Develop-
ment, Tamás Fellegi, also raised doubts for the viability of Nabucco by saying 
that the cost scenario of about EUR 24-26 billion was very optimistic.157 Al-
though experts agreed that the EUR 7.9 billion planned for the Nabucco budg-
et is an obvious underestimation, the budget received much attention, when in 
February 2011, BP estimated costs to be around EUR 14 billion. For example, 
152 Nabucco Gas Pipeline International GmbH – Press releases, May 6, 2011, http://www.nabucco-pipeline.
com/portal/page/portal/en/press/NewsText?p_item_id=A297E805CEADAB20E040A8C002017939.
153 / is is our compilation from Nabucco presentations.
154 EUobserver.com, March 5, 2010, http://euobserver.com/9/29611.
155 EurActiv.com, March 25, 2010, http://www.euractiv.com/en/energy/oettinger-says-nabucco-will-be-de-
layed-four-years-news-379171.
156 HVG.hu, July 28, 2011, http://hvg.hu/gazdasag/20110728_Mol_Hernadi_interju.
157 Reuters, October 24, 2011, http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/10/24/idUSL5E7LO1HL20111024.
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Jonathan Stern, Chairman of Natural Gas Research Programme at the Oxford 
Institute for Energy Studies, could not accept the cost being less than EUR 12 
billion.158 In early November 2011, Oettinger asserted that Nabucco’s cost fac-
tor was EUR 10 billion or more, and the schedule for transporting the & rst sup-
plies would be 2017 or 2018.159 But BP’s February 2011 statement concerning 
high costs and the March 2011 statement regarding a 10 bcma pipeline can pro-
duce a slightly di1 erent perspective when considering the end of September an-
nouncement of the South East Europe Pipeline came just before the 1 October 
2011 deadline.160 In February 2012, Oettinger approached the issue from a neu-
tral position by stating that Nabucco was just one project and that any pipeline 
could be acceptable.161 Notably important, the United States changed its policy 
towards Nabucco, and urged, in mid-November 2011, Shah Deniz produc-
ers and SOCAR to choose a smaller pipeline as the & rst pipeline with abilities 
for extension.162 / e United States expressed pessimism toward Nabucco once 
again in January 2012.163 RWE’s attitude has also changed due to costs, and in 
mid-January 2012, RWE mentioned its willingness to support other pipelines 
competing with Nabucco.164 However, in May 2012, RWE declared convinced 
support for Nabucco in its original con& guration to be the best solution.165
Shortly a; er the Hungarian announcements, OMV of Austria, Transgaz of 
Romania, and even Bayerngas of Germany (the latter negotiating to become a 
member of the Nabucco consortium in October 2011), defended the project.166 
In contrast, Bulgaria criticized the project. Apparently no signi& cance accrues 
158 The Guardian, February 20, 2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2011/feb/20/european-gas-pipe-
line-nabucco-costs-double; The New York Times, March 7, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/08/
business/global/08nabucco.html?_r=1&ref=world.
159 Reuters, November 4, 2011, http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/11/04/nabucco-idUSL6E7M-
41SN20111104.
160 Financial Times, September 26, 2011, http://www.; .com/intl/cms/s/0/ed9151b8-e84c-11e0-ab03-
00144feab49a.html.
161 Reuters, February 6, 2012, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/02/06/oettinger-gas-idUSL5E8D638 
K20120206.
162 ABC.AZ, November 16, 2011, http://abc.az/eng/news_16_11_2011_59582.html.
163 Novinite.com, January 19, 2012, http://www.novinite.com/view_news.php?id=135883.
164 Novinite.com, January 18, 2012, http://www.novinite.com/view_news.php?id=135829; RWE News, 
January 17, 2012, http://www.rwe.com/web/cms/de/37110/rwe/presse-news/pressemitteilungen/presse
mitteilungen/?pmid=4007850; Reuters, January 19, 2012, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/01/19/
energy-gas-pipelines-idUSL6E8CJ2XL20120119.
165 Reuters, May 12, 2012, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/05/12/rwe-nabucco-idUSL5E8GC 
26K20120512.
166 Reuters, April 25, 2012, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/04/25/romania-nabucco-idUSL6E-
8FP71I20120425; Reuters, April 24, 2012, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/04/24/nabucco-
mol-& nancing-idUSL5E8FOFYC20120424; Reuters, April 26, 2012, http://www.reuters.com/article/ 
2012/04/26/omv-nabucco-idUSL6E8FQ3OV20120426; Reuters, April 25, 2012, http://www.reuters.
com/article/2012/04/25/germany-nabucco-bayerngas-idUSWEA918220120425.
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to the Bulgarian’s section of Nabucco becoming a national project. / is is evi-
denced by Bulgaria’s Energy Minister declaring shortly before the Hungarian 
announcements in early April 2012 that, by 2018, Bulgaria would be able to 
rely both on gas interconnections with Romania, Serbia, Greece, and Turkey 
and on a major energy project, “be it Nabucco or something else.” Indeed, as of 
June 2011, Nabucco is not a part of Bulgaria’s Energy Strategy until 2020. Bul-
garia also clearly asserted its desire to use the national gas transmission system, 
transmitting up to 10 bcm through 2018, rather than build a new pipeline for 
the project.167 Soon a; er the Hungarian announcement, Bulgaria emphasized 
that no opportunity exists to implement the project,168 adding, however, that 
Nabucco would probably be built sometime in the very, very distant future.169 
Despite this uncertain outlook, at the end of May 2012, Bulgaria’s representa-
tive in Nabucco Gas Pipeline International GmbH considered the project to be 
the most viable aimed at connecting the Turkish gas market to Europe.170 While 
Bulgaria faces & nancial problems, building an interconnection with Turkey is of 
key priority.
At the end of July 2012, Azerbaijan’s Industry and Energy Minister declared 
that Nabucco West was the best option for piping natural gas from the Caspian 
Sea when considering East and Central Europe to be more reliable markets for 
Azeri gas.171 Obviously, Turkey has since shi; ed its priorities toward the Turk-
ish TANAP project and away from Nabucco,172 but, of course, Botaş, one of six 
shareholders in Nabucco Gas Pipeline International GmbH, supports Nabucco 
West, assuming Nabucco West to be the natural continuation of TANAP.173
According to Jonathan Stern, the decision to court Caspian gas was & rst and 
foremost a political one,174 despite gas purchases being driven by the market. 
Stern and his colleagues emphasized that Shah Deniz 2 will be an important test 
case for new commercial and, speci& cally, pricing frameworks in Europe, and 
that the Europeans are willing to buy only at hub-based prices.175 E.ON Ruhr-
gas, one of three shareholders in TAP with a 15 per cent stake, shares this view. 
167 Novinite.com, April 10, 2012, http://www.novinite.com/view_news.php?id=138403.
168 Trend, April 26, 2012, http://pda.trend.az/en/2018978.html.
169 Reuters, April 27, 2012, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/04/27/bulgaria-azerbaijan-gas-idUSL6E-
8FR3YX20120427.
170 Novinite.com, May 27, 2012, http://www.novinite.com/view_news.php?id=139715.
171 Reuters, July 24, 2012, http://af.reuters.com/article/idAFL6E8IOFZA20120724.
172 Novinite.com, January 31, 2012, http://www.novinite.com/view_news.php?id=136233.
173 Bloomberg, May 15, 2012, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-05-15/turkey-backs-nabucco-west-as-
rwe-reviews-support-for-gas-link.html.
174 K. Rausch, Pipelines on Paper, Wingas, 2012, http://www.wingas.de/2268.html?&L=1. 
175 Stern and Rogers.
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E.ON Ruhrgas clearly stated, well in advance, its interest in Azeri gas only if the 
contract is competitive and has the right formula. In addition, the European 
utilities expect pricing for supplies from the Caspian to reJ ect conditions across 
the continent’s freely traded gas hub markets.176 
BP CEO Bob Dudley insisted that the rationale for the decision on pipeline 
projects be purely economic, so tari1  levels will decide who prevails.177 Notably, 
the aim of SEEP was also a less expensive project. BP argued that without com-
petitive pipeline o1 ers, the sale of Shah Deniz gas to distant European markets 
would be without economic viability.178
/ is study does not discuss the conceptualized White Stream pipeline (Geor-
gia–Romania and Georgia–Ukraine). Apparently, the AGRI (Azerbaijan–
Georgia–Romania–Hungary Interconnector) project is also not on schedule. 
/ e participation of SOCAR in the project is a clear indication of the serious-
ness of the endeavour. Apart from TANAP, the same level of commitment is not 
observed for other projects. 
AGRI, beginning in 2010, is a new project in the Southern Corridor in which 
Azerbaijan, Georgia, Romania, and Hungary are partners, with Hungary join-
ing the partnership in 2011. A number of countries and companies have report-
edly expressed interest in the project, in particular, Serbia and Bulgaria from the 
CEE region.179 
7.  Conclusions
Since 2008, Gazprom’s market position has changed totally. Now as a piped-gas 
exporter Gazprom has a locked role in the European market. In response to the 
volatitily of gas markets, Gazprom launched gas production in the Yamal Penin-
sula and is to begin construction of the South Stream gas pipeline in December 
2012. However, in spite of its newfound position, Gazprom confronts an EU 
anti-trust probe, especially related to gas pricing. Contrary to EU standards, 
Gazprom prefers prices independent of market conditions, but if such discre-
176 Reuters, May 15, 2012, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/05/15/us-energy-summit-gas-eon-idUS-
BRE84E0ZY20120515.
177 Natural Gas Europe, August 1, 2012, http://www.naturalgaseurope.com/caspian-pipeline-choice-to-be-
based-on-tari1 -7431.
178 Argus, September 27, 2011, http://www.argusmedia.com/News/Article?id=768162.
179 Bloomberg, November 1, 2011, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-11-01/serbia-wants-to-join-
agri-gas-project-to-tap-caspian-supplies.html; Trend, September 27, 2012, http://en.trend.az/capital/en-
ergy/2070276.html; AGRI LNG http://www.agrilng.com/agrilng/Home/Istoric.
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tion continues, Gazprom will encounter increasing problems with gas exports. 
In order to avoid more arbitration, Gazprom recognizes the need to narrow the 
gap between oil-linked contract prices and hub-based market prices. A recent 
series of concessions shows that Gazprom is aware of its untenable status quo 
but has not yet accepted the need to shi;  to hub-based pricing.180
Central and Eastern European countries can gain limited advantage from the 
bene& ts of changing conditions and globalizing gas markets. / is is partly due to 
the lack of necessary import capacity and partly due to the rigidity of long-term 
contracts. Both the gas crisis in early 2009 and the conditions in 2010 revealed 
the di1 ering situations of each CEE state. / e two extremes with respect to gas 
dependence on Russia are apparent in Croatia and Poland. First, Croatia sig-
ni& cantly reduced dependence on Russian gas. / e CEE region has no similar 
example; however, Croatia’s participation in the South Stream project and the 
decision to construct a branch from South Stream to Croatia means that the 
country will purchase Russian gas in the future again. Second, despite various 
projects, Poland, due to the elimination of the intermediary Rosuknegro, has 
awarded Gazprom Export has an increased role in its gas supplies. Such inter-
mediary companies o1 ered a certain degree of diversi& cation in Hungary and 
elsewhere. Excluding Croatia, Slovenia is the least dependent on the Russian gas 
supplies and has the most diversi& ed portfolio of gas importing contracts. 
/ e position of the Czech Republic and Hungary is worse than that of Slovenia, 
but long-term contracts with Western countries and spot markets for cheaper 
natural gas a1 ord a certain degree of diversi& cation. / e January 2009 gas crisis 
forced Slovakia to initiate diversi& cation and consider securing supplies through 
measures providing contracts with Western exporters. With the exception of 
very small amounts of imported gas, Serbia purchases most of its natural gas 
from Russia, the remainder arriving from Hungary. Romania is also able to buy 
gas from Hungary and accept transfers through Hungary using the Hungarian–
Romanian interconnector completed in 2009. Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, 
Macedonia, and the Baltic States are solely dependent on Russia for gas; how-
ever, physical reverse J ow is possible for Bulgaria and Slovakia. 
Nord Stream and South Stream create large additional capacities. Gas transit 
through Belarus and Poland is expected to be minimally a1 ected; however, tran-
180 / ese are Jonathan Stern’s & ndings about the pricing principles of Gazprom. (Bloomberg, January 17, 2012, 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-01-17/gazprom-price-retreat-offers-eon-hope-as-euro-crisis-
cuts-demand.html; Bloomberg, March 14, 2012, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-03-14/gazprom-
trips-in-india-as-shale-upends-asia-gas-markets-energy.html; Financial Times, February 16, 2012, http://
www.; .com/intl/cms/s/0/2e57f4c4-58ad-11e1-9f28-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1oivhTm7f.)
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sit through Slovakia has already encountered negative e1 ects. In Central and 
Eastern Europe, South Stream has dramatically rearranged the existing trans-
portation and transit directions, thus, some former investments may prove to 
be redundant. 
Unconventional gas has the potential for increasing competition in the Russian-
dominated markets and creates an environment for lower gas prices. Still, pre-
dicting the future of unconventional gas in Central and Eastern Europe is risky; 
however, Romania and Bulgaria have been focusing on Black Sea gas. Appar-
ently, realities on the ground have started diminishing the euphoria of Polish 
shale gas.
It must further be evaluated to what extent the CEE region will demand addi-
tional gas. However, this remains di]  cult to evaluate as the forecasts are contra-
dictory, and current economic conditions and uncertainties surrounding energy 
policies confound planning, predicting, or decisions. Indeed, di1 erent countries 
in the region have adopted various initiatives to ensure security of supply and 
diversi& cation since the early 1990s and since the January 2009 crisis, in particu-
lar, but the vision or the goal of energy independence communicated in certain 
CEE countries (e.g. Hungary, Romania) is far o1 , regardless of such initiatives 
and statements.
Clearly, LNG and pipeline projects are moving forward very slowly with long 
delays. Acting on a commercial basis, these projects are acceptable but greatly 
erode the credibility of the involved governments’ and companies’ commit-
ments. In contrast to the large projects, the importance of interconnections re-
mains. Hungary has taken signi& cant steps in this area, but the Slovak–Hungar-
ian interconnector demonstrated available options when considering a project 
that de& es the terms of the market. South of Hungary, apart from any intercon-
nections with Hungary, progress is minute. A demonstration of the possibilities 
of diversi& cation, as well as a demostration of other options aside from Russian 
gas, is important for progress toward this goal.
Obtaining Azeri gas is a key step towards securing a stable and a1 ordable gas 
supply in Central and Eastern Europe. Since autumn 2011, important changes 
occured that moved the CEE toward this goal in the Southern Corridor, but 
still, achieving Azeri gas throughout the CEE remains far away. Previously exist-
ing “major” projects transferring Azeri gas devolved into smaller scale projects 
such as the South East Europe Pipeline and the Nabucco West in order to adapt 
to existing political and economic realities. / e primary problems with the 
ten-year-old Nabucco classic are unsolved; despite progress on some issues new 
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problems have arisen. SOCAR, holding a controlling stake in the Trans-Anato-
lian Gas Pipeline, can be a guarantee for the Turkish project, and other members 
of Azerbaijan’s Shah Deniz consortium can also be shareholders of the pipeline; 
however, Turkey will certainly have some di]  culty negotiating this position. 
/ e Shah Deniz consortium will also obtain shares in a pipeline that delivers gas 
from the western border of Turkey.
In the future, Azerbaijan is the only de& nite supplier of gas to Europe in the 
Southern Corridor, but with high gas prices, European utilities will queue for 
Azerbaijani gas. Also, notably, diversi& cation alone does not inevitably lead to 
supply security, and Azerbaijan has not yet demonstrated reliability as a sup-
plier.181
Among LNG regasi& cation projects in the region, the Polish and Lithuanian 
projects are expected to become operational in 2014, while the others are in 
planning stages. / e increasingly protracted issue of a regional LNG terminal in 
the Baltic States has also shown the di]  culty of achieving regional cooperation. 
In Lithuania, the LNG project gains assistance from the gas quota through the 
LNG terminal; however, in Poland, the maximum share of gas imported from 
one country has had an established limit since 2000. / is requirement is dif-
& cult to meet.
181 Rausch, Pipelines on Paper.
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